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I. INTRODUCTION
As they have for generations, the men and women of the United States
armed forces are serving in harm's way around the world.' Whether or not one
supports the conflicts in which these soldiers, sailors, marines, and air force
personnel are engaged, we can all agree that they deserve our gratitude and
respect. And, in the slightly edited words of President Abraham Lincoln, there
should also be wide consensus that society has an obligation "to care for him
[and her] who shall have borne the battle and for his widow [or her widower],
and his [or her] orphan."2 This Article discusses the current means by which
we ensure that we are faithful to President Lincoln's exhortation and how we
may be able to improve that system.
1. The United States Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense
provide information concerning the number of American servicemen and women who have died
and been injured in conflicts from the American Revolution through the present, including what
the Department refers to as the "Global War on Terror." See DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
AMERICA'S WARS (2008), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/fact/docs/amwars.pdf (providing
information concerning all conflicts with the exception of the Global War on Terror); Dep't of
Defense, U.S. Casualty Status, http://www.defenselink.millnews/casualty.pdf (providing U.S.
casualty information concerning the Global War on Terror).
2. President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 449, 450 (The Library of America ed., First
Vintage Books 1992).
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As any reader of newspapers or other media is no doubt aware, the care our
wounded veterans receive has been the subject of much concern.3 Indeed,
allegations of substandard care at Walter Reed Army Hospital led to the
appointment of a commission led by former Senator Bob Dole and former
Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala.4 The Dole-Shalala
Commission eventually issued a report making several recommendations
designed to streamline the process by which wounded veterans receive medical
care.5  Whether or not sufficient steps have been taken to follow up on the
Commission's recommendations remains uncertain.6
Of course, America's commitment to those who have served in the armed
forces goes beyond the provision of medical care that has been so much in the
public eye of late. That commitment includes the provision of a wide array of
benefits available to veterans (as well as their dependants and survivors) 7 under
United States law. 8 Just as the medical care America's veterans receive has
come under scrutiny, so too has the process by which veterans receive these
benefits. 9
3. See, e.g., Editorial, Anatomy of Neglect, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2007, at B6; Editorial,
The Plight of American Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at A20; Editorial, When Warriors
Come Limping Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A22; Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez,
For War's Gravely Injured, A Challenge to Find Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, at AI; Ann
Scott Tyson, Substandard Conditions at VA Centers Noted, WASH. POST, Apr. 15 2007, at B6.
4. See Steve Vogel, Overhaul Urged in Care for Soldiers, WASH. POST, July 26, 2007, at
A l (discussing appointment of Commission).
5. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CARE FOR AM.'S RETURNING WOUNDED WARRIORS,
SERVE, SUPPORT, SIMPLIFY 5-11, 28 (2007), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20070924010333/www.pccww.gov/docs/kit/mainbookcc5bj uly26%5 d.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Editorial, Wounded Warriors, Empty Promises, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at
A20 (criticizing the failure to follow through on the Dole-Shalala Commission's
recommendations).
7. In this Article, I will use the shorthand term "veteran" to refer to those persons entitled
to receive benefits under United States law. In reality, the category of persons encompasses more
than just the actual serviceperson, including dependants and spouses.
8. The great majority of the benefits to which veterans are entitled are codified in Title 38
of the United States Code. For a summary of many of these benefits, see VETERANS BENEFIT
ADMIN., DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, A SUMMARY OF VA BENEFITS (2006), available
at http://www.vba.va.govVBA/benefits/factsheets/general/21-00-I.pdf. A more detailed
description of the benefits to which veterans are entitled can be found in the 2008 edition of a
Department of Veterans Affairs pamphlet entitled FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS AND
DEPENDENTS (2008), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/vadocs/fedben.pdf.
9. The attention to veterans' benefits determinations is evident in the courts, Congress, and
the media. See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1066-92 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (adjudicating claims that the veterans benefits process is unconstitutional and
otherwise unlawful); Review of Veterans Disability Compensation: Undue Delay in Claims
Processing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veteran's Affairs, 1t0th Cong. (2008), available
at http://www.veterans.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?pageid= I 6&releaseid= 11731 &view=all;
Christopher Lee, Delayed Benefits Frustrate Veterans, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2007, at A4
(chronicling obstacles and delays veterans have had to overcome when seeking benefits).
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Attention to the veterans' benefits process is particularly timely now, as
2008 marked the twentieth anniversary of the enactment of the Veterans'
Judicial Review Act of 1988 (the "VJRA"). 10 Before 1988, veterans
dissatisfied with a Veterans' Administration determination of the benefits to
which they believed they were entitled were effectively precluded from
seeking judicial review of the decision." This changed with the adoption of
the VJRA. In that statute, Congress established the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court" or the "Court") under its
Article I powers to provide judicial review for veterans denied benefits.' 2
As described by its first Chief Judge, the Veterans Court was a court
"without any antecedent."' 3 It is not an exaggeration to say that the creation of
meaningful judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions was revolutionary.
It is also fair to describe the 1988 changes as experimental. After all, Congress
and the President fundamentally altered a system that had existed in "splendid
isolation" for nearly 200 years.' 4 At its heart, this Article is a call to examine
the successes and shortcomings of this revolutionary experiment. It proceeds
in four parts.
Part II describes the current process for obtaining veterans' benefits and, in
particular, the procedures by which disputes concerning such benefit
determinations are adjudicated and reviewed. After outlining the current
structure of benefits determinations and judicial review, this Part considers the
success and shortcomings of the endeavor over the past two decades.
Having set the current stage, Part III articulates an approach for evaluating
judicial review in this area including the role of the Veterans Court. It begins
10. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). At the same time, Congress elevated the
Veterans Administration to cabinet-level status and renamed the entity the United States
Department of Veterans Affairs. See Department of Veterans Affairs Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
11. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) ("Congress established no judicial
review for VA decisions until 1988, only then removing the VA from what one congressional
Report spoke of as the agency's 'splendid isolation."' (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, pt. 1, p.
10 (1988))). 1 have discussed the history of judicial review of veterans' benefits determinations
in more detail elsewhere. See Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law
(2004-2006) and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the
US. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 486-88 (2007)
[hereinafter Allen, Significant Developments].
12. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (2000). The Court was originally called the United States Court
of Veterans Appeals. See Veterans Judicial Review Act § 4051, 102 Stat. at 4113. The Court's
name was changed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims several years later.
See Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511, 112 Stat. 3315,
3341 (1998) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7251). I will refer to the body under its current name
throughout this Article.
13. Frank Q. Nebeker, Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Veterans Appeals:
Searching Out the Limits, 46 ME. L. REV. 5, 5 (1994).
14. Brown, 513 U.S. at 122.
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by explaining why such a review is warranted even if one assumes that the
current structure is functioning well. It then proceeds to call for the creation of
a commission appointed by either Congress or the President to conduct a full
evaluation of veterans' benefits determinations and their review. This
proposed commission would include representatives of all relevant
constituencies and be charged with making specific proposals to address
problems in the system and to secure perceived successes. Ideally, the
commission would also propose specific legislation to address any problems it
identifies.
In Part IV, I preview some of the courses of action open to the commission
the Article proposes. The goal of this Part is not to advocate for a particular
approach, although several possibilities are ruled out. Rather, Part IV is
designed to start the discussion that I hope will continue if a commission is
convened.
Part V is a brief conclusion. It acknowledges the political difficulties
associated with any change to the current system but ultimately argues that the
stakes are too high not to move ahead.
II. VETERANS' BENEFITS: THE CURRENT SYSTEM
In order to assess whether any changes to the system of judicial review of
veterans' benefits determinations Congress established in 1988 are warranted,
it is essential to understand the system currently in place. This Part is devoted
to that effort. It first describes the system of claiming benefits and reviewing
denials of such claims. 15 This Part is merely descriptive; it does not critique
the system. It then provides statistical information concerning the workload of
various actors in the system. 16  This information vividly demonstrates the
challenges one faces under any system that might be implemented. Finally,
this Part discusses the successes of the 1988 revolution/experiment and
identifies its shortcomings.17
A. The Current System: A Description
As of December 2007, nearly seventy-five million people were potentially
eligible to receive some benefit administered through the United States
Department of Veterans Affairs (either the "Department" or the "VA").18 The
Department projected to spend more than $80 billion during fiscal year 2007,
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See Press Release, Department of Veterans Affairs, Facts About the Department of
Veterans Affairs (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/fact/docs/vafacts.pdf. At
times, this Article will also refer to the Department as the "Secretary" where such a reference is
appropriate.
2009]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 58:361
nearly $42 billion of which was for non-health care and cemetery benefits to
which veterans are entitled. 19
A veteran wishing to receive a benefit to which she believes she is entitled
begins the process by submitting an application for such benefits with one of
the VA's more than fifty regional offices (RO) located around the country. 20 If
the veteran is awarded the benefit she seeks, the process is at an end.21
However, there are a number of reasons why the veteran may be dissatisfied
with the RO's decision.22
When the veteran is dissatisfied with the RO's decision, she has the option
to pursue an appeal within the Department by filing a "Notice of
Disagreement" (NOD) with the RO .2  The NOD triggers the RO's obligation
to prepare a "Statement of the Case" (SOC) setting forth the bases of the
decision being challenged.24 If the veteran wishes to pursue her appeal after
receiving the SOC, she must file VA Form 9 with the RO indicating her desire
that the appeal be considered by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board).2 5
Congress provided that veterans are entitled to "one review on appeal to the
Secretary [of the Department of Veterans Appeals]" when denied benefits.26
In actuality, that appeal is taken to the Board.27 The Board is led by a
Chairperson, appointed by the President and confirmed -by the Senate, and a
Vice Chairperson, designated by the Secretary.28 As of the end of 2007, it was
19. Id The Department of Veterans Affairs "is the second largest of the 15 Cabinet
departments." Id.
20. See BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, How Do I APPEAL? 3 (VA pamph. 01-02-02A, Apr.
2002), available at http://www.va.gov/vbs/bva/010202A.pdf [hereinafter How Do I APPEAL];
VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 12.1.1, at 853 (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B. Abrams eds.,
2007).
21. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 20, § 12.1.1, at 853.
22. The two most common bases for disagreeing with the RO's decision are that: (1) the RO
determined the veteran is not entitled to the benefit she seeks at all; and (2) while the veteran is
entitled to the benefit at issue, the claimed disability is "rated" at a level below which the veteran
believes is correct. See How Do I APPEAL, supra note 20, at 1. With respect to ratings decisions,
the RO will assign a percentage from 0 to 100 based on its assessment of the veterans' disability.
That rating will then be translated into the monthly payment a veteran receives. The rating
decision also affects whether the veteran's dependants are eligible for benefits. See FEDERAL
BENEFITS FOR VETERANS AND DEPENDANTS, supra note 8, at 15-16 (describing rating process).
23. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2000); see also How DO I APPEAL, supra note 20, at 4
(explaining process for veterans).
24. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d); see also How DOI APPEAL, supra note 20, at 5.
25. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3); How DO I APPEAL, supra note 20, at 6. The veteran also
has the option to seek review before a Decision Review Officer (DRO) at the RO. This level of
review is optional. For a discussion of DRO review, see VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra
note 20, § 12.8, at 924-27.
26. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a).
27. Id.
28. See id. § 7101(b)(1) (describing appointment of the Chairperson); id. § 7101(b)(4)
(describing appointment of the Vice Chairperson).
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comprised of fifty-six Veterans Law Judges29 and more than 250 staff counsel
and other support personnel.3a
The Board bases its decision "on the entire record in the proceeding and
upon consideration of all evidence and material of record and applicable
provisions of law and regulation."3' In addition to the material developed at
the RO, the Board may also conduct personal hearings with the veteran at
which the veteran may add new evidence to the record. 2 Before 1988, the
Board's decision in a veteran's appeal was final and not subject to further
review.33 As described below, a final Board decision adverse to the veteran
merely concludes the administrative process.
Currently, if a veteran is dissatisfied with a final decision of the Board, she
may elect to appeal that decision to the Veterans Court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to review such matters.3 4 The Secretary may not appeal an adverse
Board decision.3 5  Congress created the Veterans Court under its Article I
powers.3 6 The Court is currently comprised of seven judges appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve fifteen-year
terms. 3 7 The Veterans Court has the "power to affirm, modify, or reverse a
decision of the Board or to remand the matter, as appropriate." 3 The Veterans
29. "Veterans Law Judge" is the term used to refer to those formally known as Board
Members. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 20, § 13.1.2, at 970 (citing 68 Fed.
Reg. 6621 (Feb. 10, 2003)). They are appointed to "undefined terms" and are subject to
performance reviews conducted by a panel of other members of the Board. Id. Board members
are appointed by the Secretary with the approval of the President. 38 U.S.C. § 7101A(a)(l).
30. See BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, DEP'T OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE
CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2007 2 (2007), available at http://www.va.gov/vetapp/chairRpt/
BVA2007AR.pdf [hereinafter 2007 BOARD REPORT].
31. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a).
32. See How Do I APPEAL, supra note 20, at 8-10.
33. See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 5-11 (2002); see also IHOR GAWDIAK ET AL., FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, VETERANS BENEFITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 66 (1992) (on file with the Catholic University
Law Review) ("Until the United States Court of Veterans Appeals was established in November
1988, the board's decisions were final, except for issues concerning insurance contracts, which
were subject to action in Federal district courts."). There were limited exceptions to this
preclusion of judicial review focusing on constitutional challenges. See id. at 67-68. However,
these exceptions did little for the garden variety benefits denial.
34. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
35. Id.
36. See id. § 7251.
37. See id. § 7253(a)-(c). The Court may operate with as few as three judges. See id §
7252(a). There are currently seven active judges on the bench. See Judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/about/judges (last visited
Jan. 20, 2009). Effective December 31, 2009, Congress has provided for two additional judges
for the Court. See Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389 § 601, 122
Stat. 4145, 4176-77 (amending 38 U.S.C. § 7253).
38. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
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Court is an appellate body that Congress specifically precluded from making
factual determinations. 39 The Court has ruled that its jurisdiction is limited to
denial (or other dissatisfaction with) individual claims determinations;
specifically, the Court is without power to adjudicate class actions or other
aggregate litigation concerning more generic veterans benefit issues that may
affect groups of veterans.
40
Any aggrieved party may appeal a final decision of the Veterans Court to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 41 Review of Federal
Circuit decisions is available by writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States. 42  Review in these Article III courts is limited by statute.
Specifically, in the absence of a constitutional issue, the Federal Circuit (and at
least by implication the Supreme Court) may review only legal questions; it is
expressly precluded from ruling on a factual determination or on the
43application of law to the facts in a particular case.
Figure A summarizes the current procedures for considering challenges to
the determination of entitlement to veterans' benefits:
39. See id. § 7261(c).
40. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1, 8 (2007) (en banc) (holding that the
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought by an organization as opposed to an
individual veteran); Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, I Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991) (rejecting contention
that court had the authority to adjudicate class actions).
41. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292. The Federal Circuit was created by Congress as an Article III
tribunal in 1982. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Unlike the other federal circuit courts
of appeals, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is subject-specific, not geographic. See 28 U.S.C. §
1295 (2000) (setting forth Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction). In the veterans' law context, in
addition to hearing appeals from the Veterans Court's decisions, the Federal Circuit also has
"exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or
regulation or any interpretation thereof' under Title 38. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (providing for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction concerning
decisions of the courts of appeals).
43. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
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B. Workload in the Current System
As described in this subpart, the workload borne by many of the links in the
veterans' benefits chain of review is staggering. Understanding the magnitude
of the caseload at the various levels of decision is critical to assessing the
success of the current system as well as any changes that might be proposed to
it.
In 2007, the VA processed approximately 825,000 claims for benefits from
veterans. 44 The great majority of these claims did not result in an appeal,45 but
the volume alone indicates in graphic detail the workload of the first-line
adjudicators in the system at the RO level. In addition, each year a significant
number of veterans are unsatisfied with RO decisions. It is on these claims
that this Article focuses. The first relevant statistic in this regard concerns the
number of NODs filed at the RO level. In fiscal year 2007, there were 102,752
NODs filed requiring RO personnel to prepare SOCs.
4 6
As described above, the first level of RO review occurs at the Board. For
fiscal year 2007, the Board physically received 39,817 cases in which veterans
appealed RO decisions after the veteran had filed a NOD and the RO had
issued a SOC.47 Recall that there are only fifty-six Veterans Law Judges (plus
the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson). This results in nearly 700 cases per
adjudicator, assuming that both the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson
actually adjudicate individual claims. In sum, agency decision-makers at both
the RO and the Board are very busy people.4 9
Matters do not change materially as one moves from the administrative
process into the court system. In 2007, there were 4644 new cases filed at the
Veterans Court.50 The Court decided 4877 cases during that period. 51 As a
44. See DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, STRATEGIC GOALS (2008), http://www.va.gov/
vetdata/docs/Pamphlet_2-1-08.pdf. The Department predicts that claims will exceed 1,000,000 in
2008. Veterans Disability Benefits Claims Modernization Act of 2008, H.R. 5892 110th Cong. §
2(6) (Apr. 24, 2008).
45. See 2007 BOARD REPORT, supra note 30, at 14 (noting that the Board received 39,817
appeals during fiscal year 2007).
46. See id. at 18.
47. See id. at 14. During this time there were about 5000 additional cases in which a Form
9 indicating an intent to appeal was filed, but the case had not actually arrived at the Board. Id.
48. Id. at 2.
49. One could make the same point concerning the Board by considering the decisions
issued as opposed to appeals received. In fiscal year 2007, the Board issued 40,401 decisions in
appeals. Id. at 2. Moreover, the statistics for files received and decisions issued in 2007 were not
anomalies. In fiscal years 2004-2006, the Board received no fewer than 39,956 cases. Id. at 14.
It predicts that it will have received 43,000 cases in fiscal year 2008. Id. at 15.
50. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT (2007), available
at http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/documents/AnnualReports_2007.pdf [hereinafter VETERANS
COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT].
51. Id. This rate of decision is, at least in part, possible because of the Veterans Court's use
of its power to decide certain cases through single-judge opinions as opposed to disposition by a
panel ofjudges. See 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b) (2000). I have commented critically elsewhere on the
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House of Representatives committee recently recognized, the Court's workload
"makes it one of the busiest federal appellate courts. ' 52 Not surprisingly, the
Court's workload has prompted congressional concern 53 as well as led to the
recall to service of all but one of the retired judges of the Veterans Court.54 As
with other adjudicators in the system, the Veterans Court is laboring to keep
pace with a massive workload.55
The next level of decision-maker is the Federal Circuit. In 2007, 21% of the
appeals filed with the Federal Circuit concerned appeals from the Veterans
56Court. In other words, approximately 325 of the Federal Circuit's 1545 filed
cases in fiscal year 2007 originated in the Veterans Court. 57 And what of the
future? In his State of the Court address, Chief Judge Paul Michel recentl y
suggested that the Federal Circuit anticipated "floods of veterans' cases."
use of this mode of decision-making. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at
515-21; see also Sarah M. Haley, Comment, Single-Judge Adjudication in the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims and the Devaluation of Stare Decisis, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 535, 564-71
(2004) (critically discussing the use of the single-judge procedure). For present purposes,
however, the use of single-judge adjudication is some evidence of the steps that the Court has
taken to address its massive caseload.
52. See H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at 18 (2008). For a detailed statistical summary of the
workload of all the circuit courts of appeals, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 86
tbl. B-1 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
[hereinafter 2007 JUDICIAL BUSINESS].
53. For example, a House of Representatives Veterans Affairs' Committee report recently
commented that the committee was "concerned with [the Court's] growing backlog of appeals."
H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at 18.
54. Congress provided that the Chief Judge of the Veterans Court may recall retired judges
of the Court if their service is required. See 38 U.S.C. § 7257. Chief Judge William Greene has
exercised his authority under this statute numerous times within the past two years. See, e.g.,
Miscellaneous Orders 2007, United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (2007)
[hereinafter Miscellaneous Orders 2007] (Nos. 23-07, 22-07, 16-07, 03-07, 02-07, 01-07),
available at http://www.vetapp.gov/miscellaneous-orders/MiscellaneousOrders2007.cfm.
55. As with the Board, the figures for the Veterans Court during 2007 are not aberrational.
See VETERANS COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50 (reporting new filings with a low of
2150 in 2002 to a high of 3729 in 2006).
56. See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeals Filed, by Category,
FY 2007, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/ChartFilings07.pdf.
57. Compare United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Historical Caseload:
Appeals Filed FY 1983-FY 2007, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/HIST%20
CASELOAD%2083-07%20CHART.pdf (showing all cases filed in Federal Circuit), with United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeals Filed in Major Origins: FY 1983 - FY
2007, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/l Oyr/2OHist%2OCaseld%20by%/20Origin.pdf (breaking
down filed appeals by category of body from which decision was rendered).
58. See Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, Fed. Cir., Address to the Federal Circuit Judicial
Conference on the State of the Court 4 (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/pdf/State%20of /o20the%20Court%/o205-08.pdf. These comments track those Chief Judge
Michel made earlier expressing concern about the volume of cases in the Federal Circuit
regarding veterans' benefits matters. See The US. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
Thus, the Federal Circuit is not immune to the demands the veterans' benefits
system imposes.
59
C. An Evaluation of the Current System
The previous two subparts have described the current system under which
veterans' benefits are adjudicated and judicially reviewed and the workloads of
the various entities engaged in that enterprise. This subpart evaluates the
successes and shortcomings of that system over the past two decades.
1. Successes of Judicial Review
The establishment of judicial review of veterans' benefits determinations in
1988 led to several important improvements in the system by which we honor
America's service members. This part discusses the four most significant
ways in which the creation ofjudicial review in this area has succeeded.
a. Development of the Law
A primary focus, and central success, of the Veterans Court has been the
doctrinal development of the law of veterans' benefits. When the Court began
operations twenty years ago, there was almost no law concerning veterans'
benefits determinations outside of the implementation of congressional statutes
by the VA. 60  Today, there are twenty-two volumes of West's Veterans
Appeals Reporter containing the precedential opinions of the Court.
6
'
A review of those volumes shows an institution that has worked diligently to
bring order, predictability and transparency to the system. Do not get me
wrong-there is still doctrinal confusion in certain areas.62 Moreover, as I
Could Rising Appeals Swamp the Court?, THE THIRD BRANCH (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2007, at 7
(discussing concerns of Chief Judge Michel).
59. Matters are different, of course, at the Supreme Court. That body has to date decided
only two cases originating in the Veterans Court. See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401,
404-06 (2004) (holding that a timely filed application for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act may be amended after the thirty-day period the statute provides to file an
application); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 116-17 (1994) (holding that the Department
exceeded its authority when it promulgated a regulation requiring a person injured in a VA
hospital to prove negligence under the existing statute). The Supreme Court agreed to hear an
additional case during its October 2008 Term. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir.
2007), cert. granted sub nom. Peake v. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2935 (June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1209).
The Supreme Court will review the Federal Circuit's opinion and decide whether the
Department's failure to provide a veteran certain notices required under law should be presumed
to be prejudicial to the veteran.
60. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 486-87.
61. See VETERANS APPEALS REPORTER Vol. 1-22 (1992-2008). There is also a body of
law developed by the Federal Circuit in its role in the system.
62. The purpose of this Article is not to discuss the substance of the law of veterans'
benefits. I have done this elsewhere, at least for the years 2004-2008. See Allen, Significant
Developments, supra note 11, at 496-514; Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims: Past, Present, and Future 2-24 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript
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have argued elsewhere, the Court has not always done as much as one would
hope to be a systematic lawmaker in the area as opposed to a mere corrector of
Board decisions in individual cases. 63 Nevertheless, the Court has been quite
successful in creating a coherent body of law concerning veterans' benefits.
In addition, the Veterans Court has contributed to a growth in uniformity and
predictability in the law concerning veterans' benefits. The Court's
precedential opinions, subject to Federal Circuit review, provide broad rules
governing the claims adjudication process throughout the agency and across
the country. All actors in the system are in a position to know the law when it
is settled and to make reasonable predictive judgments about outcomes in
individual cases. Such uniformity and predictability could certainly be said to
be staples of the rule of law itself. In that respect, the development of
uniformity and predictability over the past twenty years is an important success
ofjudicial review under the VJRA.
b. Development of the Court as an Institution
It is easy to forget the challenges that faced the Veterans Court at its
inception. The judges of the Court were confronted with a situation almost
unheard of in American law. 64 In addition to writing on a clean slate in terms
of the content of veterans' benefits law, the judges were also required to build
an institution from the ground up. 65 Where was the Court physically to be
located? How was it to pay its bills? How did it fit into other governmental
structures? Answering all these questions was as important to the success of
the enterprise as was producing solid judicial opinions. 66
Once it was established physically, the Court then needed to focus on its
substantive work. One of the striking aspects of the history of the Veterans
Court is the conscious way in which the judges of the Court, over time,
prepared in conjunction with the Tenth Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims, on file with the Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter Allen, Past,
Present, and Future].
63. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 514-22 (describing dual roles of
Veterans Court as correcting Board errors and acting as a "law-giver" by issuing precedential
opinions).
64. See Nebeker, supra note 13, at 6 & n.3 (observing that, apart from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, "[v]ery few other federal courts ... were created without any
predecessor tribunal").
65. See id. at 6-7.
66. The Veterans Court's first Chief Judge recently described some of these practical
challenges when he spoke at the Court's Tenth Judicial Conference. See Frank Nebeker, Chief
Judge (Ret.), United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Remarks at the Tenth Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 8-16 (Apr. 14, 2008)
(transcript on file with the Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter Nebeker Remarks].
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
developed the institution as a court. It is one thing for Congress to say that it is
creating a court of law; 67 it is quite another for that institution to become one.
First, the Court issued decisions early on that aligned it in many important
respects with more traditional federal courts. For example, in Mokal v.
68Derwinski, the Court adopted as a matter of policy the case or controversy
requirements binding Article III courts under the Constitution.69 The Court
was not obligated to take this approach.70 Moreover, even if one believes that
the Court should not follow these requirements today, Mokal was correctly
decided at the time. The Court recognized in 1990 that it needed to establish
itself as a judicial body7' and not merely an adjunct of the Department.
Adopting the case or controversy requirements went a long way in this regard.
One can also see this effort to tie the Veterans Court to other, more
traditional, judicial bodies in its firm commitment to time limits associated
with filings at the Court. As I have explained elsewhere, the Veterans Court
has been far stricter on veterans than has the Federal Circuit in this regard.72
One reason for this difference between the courts might very well be the
Veterans Court's need to be more cognizant of establishing itself as an
institution.
Second, the Veterans Court has fought to establish and assert its
independence from the Department. I will not dwell on this topic here. I
discuss below two recent examples of the Veterans Court's efforts to ensure
that its decisions are binding even when parties such as the Secretary do not
agree with them.73 These actions have been essential to making judicial review
in this area as successful as it has been.
Third, the Veterans Court has developed procedures that seek to preserve its
role as an appellate tribunal while coping with a staggering caseload. 74 Most
importantly in this respect, perhaps, is the Court's use of its authority to decide
cases by single-judge opinions. In an important early opinion, the Court set
out a test now contained in the Court's Internal Operating Procedures for
determining when a case was appropriate for single-judge disposition. 6 I have
67. See 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2000) ("There is hereby established, under Article I of the
Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims.").
68. 1 Vet. App. 12 (1990).
69. Id. at 14-15.
70. Id. at 14.
71. Seeid. at 15.
72. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 497-502.
73. See infra Part II.C.2.
74. The caseload concern is discussed above. See supra Part lI.B.
75. See 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b) (2000).
76. See Frankel v. Derwinski, I Vet. App. 23, 25-26 (1990); UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 11(b), at 1-2 (2004),
available at http://www.vetapp.gov/documents/IOP2004.pdf.
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not been a fan of the single-judge procedure-at least not with the frequency
with which the Court has used it.77 Nevertheless, it is an innovative tool that is
emblematic of the Court's efforts to develop itself as an institution.
c. The Perception of Fairness and Process for Veterans
A common refrain in the congressional hearings that led up to the enactment
of the VJRA was that veterans were being denied basic due process protections
78
afforded to most other Americans. The path to the courts was open to those
claiming the wrongful denial of other government benefits, but not to the men
and women who served in the armed forces.79
Of course, there were also dissenting voices in the hearings. Their claim
was largely based on the historic understanding of the veterans' benefits
system. 81  The VA at the time (as well as today) described its system for
awarding benefits and administratively reviewing these decisions as non-
adversarial. 82  The argument continued that no outside review was required
because the system was inherently fair-indeed, more than fair-to the
veteran.
83
Yet such claims of inherent fairness did not rest easy alongside the long
tradition of due process in this country. Congress recognized this reality and
enacted the VJRA to align veterans with most other people in the United States
in terms of the availability of a neutral (and, perhaps most importantly, a
77. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 515-21.
78. See, e.g., S. 11, The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure and
Judicial Review Act, and S. 2292, Veterans' Judicial Review Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Veterans'Affairs, 100th Cong. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Senate VJRA Hearing] (statement of Sen.
Alan Cranston, Chairman, S. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs) ("I want to be clear that my
motivation in continuing to push for judicial review is the belief that it is a fundamental right
which should be afforded to all veterans"); id. at 17 (statement of Sen. John Kerry) (describing
the importance of judicial review in America and stating "[v]eterans-veterans-are the only
class of people in the United States of America who don't have the right to get that kind of
independent review").
79. See id at 17 (statement of Sen. Kerry).
80. A prime example of this point can be seen in the questioning of the minority chief
counsel to the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee in connection with the VJRA. He stated "we
hear the cliches and the slogans-some of them are very, very important-about due process and
growing accustomed to revere judicial review, that veterans should be treated no differently than
criminals, Social Security recipients, illegal aliens; and that is certainly true." Id. at 26 (statement
of Anthony Principi, Minority Chief Counsel, S. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs). However, he then
went on to argue against changing the system absent "some underlying justification" for moving
away from the VA's current practices. Id.
81. See id.
82. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1988) ("Proceedings before the Veterans Administration are
ex parte in nature. It is the obligation of the Veterans Administration to assist a claimant in
developing the facts pertinent to his claim and to render a decision which grants him every benefit
that can be supported in law while protecting the interests of the Government."); see also 38
C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (2007).
83. See Senate VJRA Hearing, supra note 78, at 26 (statement of Mr. Principi).
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perceived-neutral) and unbiased body to review benefits determinations. 84 To
be sure, there are still complaints about the process of adjudication and its
inherent fairness, particularly within the Department.85  Nevertheless, the
provision of adjudicators outside the VA has added a certain legitimacy to the
process that was lacking. This is a gain under the VJRA that should not be
discounted.
d. Improving the Quality ofAdministrative Decisions
A final success of the Veterans Court and judicial review in general over the
past twenty years has been the increase in the quality of administrative
decisions within the VA, particularly at the Board level. A concern with
poorly explained and reasoned decisions was one of the issues mentioned in
congressional hearings concerning the creation of the Veterans Court in
861988. That issue was clearly on the minds of the early judges of the Court as
a major goal of judicial review. Indeed, in private discussions with the author,
many of the retired judges of the Court commented that one of the Veterans
Court's principal successes has been improved decision-making at the VA.87
Such improved decision-making has also been noted in Congress.
88
There are, of course, different ways to judge whether decision-making has
"improved." The most obvious, perhaps, is to judge whether the ultimate
outcome of the decisions rendered at the Agency is correct more often than not
before judicial review. I suspect that the Veterans Court has had a positive
effect measured in this way, but it is difficult to tell. There was no judicial
review before 1988 so we have little with which to compare reversal rates
today. The affirmance rate, at least over the past ten years, has fluctuated
without much in the way of explanation.
89
Another way in which to assess the quality of opinions at the Agency level
turns on their content, not simply their result. It is in this respect that I believe
84. See id at 49 (statement of Frank E.G. Weil, Nat'l Sec'y, Am. Veterans Comm.); id. at
50 (statement of Dr. Dorothy Legarreta, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors); id at 52
(statement of Philip Cushman, President, Nat'l Due Process, Inc.).
85. See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (rejecting claims by a veterans group that the VA adjudication process denied veterans due
process and was otherwise unlawful). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 107-13
and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Senate VJRA Hearing, supra note 78, at 8 (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson)
(lamenting that the VA did not "document[] ... factors and considerations which lead to denial[s
of claims]").
87. The author retains copies of notes of conversations with all but one of the retired judges
of the Veterans Court. These conversations were "off-the-record," in that the author agreed not to
identify any comments made by particular judges.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at 18-19 (2008) (recognizing improved administrative
decision-making but expressing concern about the effect of the improvement on the overall
timeliness of decisions).
89. See VETERANS COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50.
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the retired judges of the Court see the greatest improvement. I agree.
Moreover, that improvement is not merely accidental. Instead, it is a direct
result of the Veterans Court's rigorous enforcement of the statutory
requirement that the Board provide adequate reasons and bases for its
decisions.9° Are Board decisions perfect today? Of course not, but they are
better both in terms of reasoning and, perhaps equally importantly, in the
information they provide to the veteran. This increase in transparency and
perception (as well as reality) of process is an accomplishment that should not
be overlooked or undervalued.
2. Shortcomings of Judicial Review
Despite the successes outlined above, the past twenty years have also
demonstrated that there are weaknesses in the current system. This subpart
discusses six of the most significant weaknesses.
a. Delay for Veterans Seeking Benefits
Perhaps the most significant shortcoming of the current system of veterans'
benefits determinations and their judicial review is the delay that veterans face.
Delay is a facet of nearly every part of the process. At the RO stage, the
average time for the processing of a filed claim in 2007 was 183 days.93 At the
Board in 2007, the average time between the date an appeal was physically
received and the date when the Board mailed a decision to the veteran was 136
days.9" Finally, at the Veterans Court in 2007, the median time from the filing
of an appeal to disposition was 416 days. 95  When these statistics are
aggregated the result is truly stunning. For claims appealed to the Veterans
Court, average time to disposition is between five and seven years.
96
90. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (2000).
91. See, e.g., Hupp v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 342, 355 (2007) (explaining that the "reasons
or bases" requirement ensures that the decision is "adequate to enable the appellant to understand
the precise basis for the Board's decision as well as to facilitate review in [the Veterans Court]");
Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 56-57 (1990) (discussing reasons and bases requirement).
92. The Board continues to strive to improve its decision-making. For example, in his most
recent report, the Board Chairman discussed his initiative to continue improvement in the quality
of Board decisions. See 2007 BOARD REPORT, supra note 30, at 5.
93. See Veterans Disability Benefits Claims Modernization Act of 2008, H.R. 5892, 11 0th
Cong. § 2(8) (2008); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-789, at 2 (2008) (analyzing VA statistics and
noting that "[a]s VA's inventory of claims increases, its realistic ability to process these claims in
a timely fashion under its current system has been called into serious question").
94. See 2007 BOARD REPORT, supra note 30, at 2. The significant delays in resolution of
appeals within the Department have also been judicially recognized in a lawsuit filed by certain
groups representing veterans. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1073-74 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 1 discuss this case later in this subpart. As I explain, the district court
ultimately ruled against the veterans groups in the matter. Id. at 1091-92.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 110-789, at 18. This was a significant increase from the 2006 median
time from filing to disposition of 351 days. Id.
96. Id.
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In addition to the sheer volume of claims adjudicated at each level of the
system,97 a significant cause of the delays veterans experience is the use of
remands by both the Board and the Veterans Court. In 2007, the Board
remanded nearly 36% of all cases to the RO or another VA body. 98 When the
Board remands a case, it "typically adds more than a year to the appellate
process." 99  Moreover, of these remanded matters, approximately 75%
eventually return to the Board for further proceedings. The Board has
indicated that one of its primary goals for the future is to "[e]liminat[e]
avoidable remands."
10 1
Remands have also plagued matters at the Veterans Court. Disaggregating
the statistics the Court provides to determine the precise number of remands is
not an easy task. According to a report prepared by the House Veterans'
Affairs Committee in 2007 the Veterans Court issued "3,211 merit decisions,
the majority of which, more than 2000, were remanded (some in part only) and
1,098 were affirmed."'10 2 Even if the Committee's statistics are off by 50%,103
remands at the Veterans Court would still be a significant delay-causing
problem in the current system.
0 4
b. Prejudice to Veterans from the Transition from the "Non-Adversarial"
VA Process to the Adversarial Proceedings at the Veterans Court
The agency adjudication system is largely premised on its non-adversarial
and paternalistic nature.'0 5 There is real debate on whether that state of affairs
remains the case, if it ever was an accurate description. 0 6 Moreover, there has
97. See supra Part II.B (providing statistics concerning number of claims adjudicated at RO,
Board, and Veterans Court).
98. 2007 BOARD REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at 18 (2008). It appears that the House Committee used the
Veterans Court's 2007 Annual Report as the basis for this statement. That report confirms that
the Court issued 3211 merits decision in 2007. See VETERANS COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 50. The report also indicates that 442 of these decisions were "[a]ffirmed or dismissed
in part, reversed/vacated & remanded in part," 524 were "[r]eversed/vacated & remanded," and
1079 were "[r]emanded." Id. It appears that the committee's reference to more than 2000
decisions being remanded was reached by adding these three numbers together.
103. In other words, if one were to consider just the 1079 decisions in which the only action
of the Court was remand. See id.
104. 1 have written elsewhere about the problems inherent in the Veterans Court's use of
remands. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 528-29.
105. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
106. A full discussion of the reality of the nature of VA adjudication is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, an excellent illustration of the confusion about the true state of affairs in
this regard can be found in opinions rendered by a district court in connection with litigation
challenging the nature of the VA process, which I discuss later in this subpart. See infra notes
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been clear movement toward a more traditional adversarial model in recent
years. For example, in 2006 Congress removed a preexisting barrier that
effectively precluded a claimant from hiring attorneys before a final Board
decision.' 7 The likely increased presence of lawyers in the agency process
will almost certainly further move the system in an adversarial direction.
Whatever the reality is, there has been, and remains, a tension between the
agency-level process and the unquestionably traditional adversarial process at
the Veterans Court and beyond.108 In a sense, veterans transitioning from one
system to another have the potential to be caught unaware of new rules and
other formalities. A prime example of this difficulty concerns the strict
application of the time within which a veteran must file her notice of appeal of
an adverse Board decision. A veteran dissatisfied with a final Board decision
must file a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court within 120 days after the
Board mails notice of the decision at issue to the veteran. 0 9 Both the Federal
Circuit and the Veterans Court have wrestled with how strictly to construe this
limitation. As a general matter, the Federal Circuit has been more willing to
"equitably toll" the 120-day period than has the Veterans Court." 0 For present
107-11 and accompanying text. For present purposes, it is instructive to note that in denying in
major part a motion to dismiss, the district court wrote:
If the VA claims adjudication system were truly non-adversarial, then Plaintiffs' due
process claim would be on shaky ground. And although the system was clearly
intended to be non-adversarial, Plaintiffs have alleged that this is no longer the case.
The Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction under the VJRA, has
recognized this de-facto shift towards an adversarial system. [The district court then
cited Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).]
Although it is clearly not in this Court's power to rewrite a statute that provides for a
non-adversarial adjudication process at the regional office level, it is within the Court's
power to insist that veterans be granted a level of due process that is commensurate
with the adjudication procedures with which they are confronted.
Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919, at *15-16
(N.D. Cal. Jan 10, 2008). However, a more recent decision by the Northern District of California
added to the uncertainty by suggesting that the nature of the VA adjudicatory process was not
necessarily so clear. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1087
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that, four years after Bailey--the case the district court cited when
denying in part the motion to dismiss-the Federal Circuit suggested that "the process at the RO
level remains non-adversarial"). Suffice it to say, the true state of affairs remains murky at best.
107. See Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3403, 3407 (2006) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1)).
108. I have written about this tension elsewhere. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra
note 11, at 526-28.
109. See 38 U.S.C. § 7266 (2000).
110. I have discussed this issue in depth in prior writings. See Allen, Significant
Developments, supra note 11, at 497-502; Allen, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 62, at 4-9.
The Supreme Court has recently called into question the doctrine of equitable tolling in general
when there is a statutorily mandated time within which to file an appeal. See Bowles v. Russell,
127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007) (holding that "the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is
a jurisdictional requirement" and that the requirement may not be tolled or otherwise avoided). A
consideration of the effect of Bowles in the context of the Veterans Court is beyond the scope of
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purposes, the importance of this issue is an example of the pitfalls that a
veteran faces when moving from a system designed, at least in part, to be non-
adversarial, to one that follows more traditional practices."II
c. The Relationship Between the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit
The relationship between the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit is
unique for several reasons. First, there is no other situation in the federal court
system in which the decisions of one appellate body are subject to review as of
right in another appellate body, other than the Supreme Court. This feature of
the system has several potentially negative effects. It undermines, in at least
some respect, the ability of the Veterans Court to serve its role as the expert
lawmaker in this area of law. In addition, it engenders even further delay in a
system beset by it.
1 12
A second unique feature of the system is the limited nature of the Federal
Circuit's review of Veterans Court decisions. Except in cases raising
constitutional issues, the Federal Circuit is precluded from reviewing issues of
fact or the application of law to fact. 1 3 In many cases, this limitation on
appellate review requires that the Federal Circuit wrestle with jurisdictional
questions instead of, or before, reaching the merits.
114
Each of these unique features of the formal relationship between the Federal
Circuit and the Veterans Court is a cause of some dysfunction in the current
system. However, there is also a less formal issue between these two bodies
that is the cause of some concern. As I have explored in a prior article, these
two courts at times treat one another with a lack of respect that is surprising. 15
For example, the Veterans Court has taken the position that the Federal Circuit
does not understand the very nature of the Veterans Court's role in the
process.1 6 For its part, the Federal Circuit has treated the Veterans Court asthough it misunderstands the role of the Veterans Court in the system as a
this Article. For a discussion of the issue, see Allen, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 62, at
7-9.
111. This difficulty is enhanced by the high rate of pro se appeals at the time of filing in the
Veterans Court. For example, in 2007, 53% of veterans were unrepresented at the time of filing.
See VETERANS COuRT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50.
112. Congress has noted this feature of dual appellate review. See H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at
20 (2008) (noting that the Veterans Court's retired judges had testified that the additional level of
review at the Federal Circuit had added to delay).
113. See 38 U.S.C. § 7296(d)(2).
114. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 541-42 app. B (collecting
Federal Circuit's jurisdictional decisions in a two-year period).
115. See id. at 523-26.
116. See, e.g., Bobbitt v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 547, 553 (2004) ("[T]he Federal Circuit
apparently presumes that this Court is part of VA .... "). I provide additional examples of the
Veterans Court's attitude toward the Federal Circuit in my earlier article. See Allen, Significant
Developments, supra note 11, at 523 n.233.
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whole. 117  The bottom line is that the uneasy, and at times, awkward,
relationship between these two courts has become a serious negative aspect of
the current system of judicial review of veterans' benefits determinations.
d. The Relationship Between the Veterans Court and the Department
A driving force behind the enactment of the VJRA was the desire to have a
body independent of the Department review veterans' benefits
determinations. 118  The Veterans Court was that body. However, the
Department has not always treated the Court with the respect it is due. At some
level, tension between the Department and the Veterans Court was to be
expected. After all, for nearly two centuries the Department and its
predecessors had been the final word in the area." 19  But one would have
expected this tension to resolve itself after twenty years. It has not.
The Department continues to treat the Veterans Court in a manner
inconsistent with an independent adjudicative body. A prime example is the
Secretary's actions in the wake of the Veterans Court's decision in Haas v.
Nicholson.120 In Haas, the Veterans Court held that the presumption of service
connection for certain diseases related to exposure to Agent Orange for
117. As I describe in my earlier article, the back-and-forth between the Federal Circuit and
the Veterans Court concerning the doctrine of equitable tolling provides an example of this
tension. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 497-502. 1 discussed equitable
tolling above. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
118. See supra Part II.A.
119. See supra Part II.A (discussing effective absence of judicial review before enactment of
the VJRA in 1988).
120. 20 Vet. App. 257 (2006). The Federal Circuit eventually reversed and remanded the
Veterans Court's decision. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 77
U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Jan 21, 2009) (No. 08-525). This reversal on substantive grounds does not
affect the impropriety of the Secretary's actions with respect to the Veterans Court's initial
decision as discussed in the text.
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veterans having "service in the Republic of Vietnam"'1 21 included service on
ships near the shore of that nation.'
2
For present purposes, Haas is significant not for its substantive holding, but
rather for the Secretary's reaction to it. In addition to appealing the Veterans
Court's decision to the Federal Circuit, the Secretary also ordered the Board
Chairman to stay all cases pending before the Board that were affected by
Haas.'23 The Board Chairman followed the Secretary's direction. 12  Neither
the Secretary nor the Board Chairman sought court approval---either at the
Veterans Court or the Federal Circuit-before staying the Haas-related
cases. 125
Nicholas Ribaudo, a veteran whose case was pending before the Board and
who would arguably have been entitled to Haas's interpretation of the Agent
Orange presumption, sought a writ of mandamus from the Veterans Court
ordering the Board Chairman to rescind the memorandum and adjudicate his
claim according to established procedures.' 26 The Veterans Court, in an en
banc opinion, granted the writ, concluding:
Because the head of an executive agency does not have the authority
to nullify the legal effect of a judicial decision, and because the
Secretary did just that by ordering the issuance of Board Chairman's
Memorandum 01-06-24 imposing a stay of indefinite duration
without first seeking judicial imprimatur, the petition [for a writ of
mandamus] will be granted. 127
121. Haas, 20 Vet. App. at 259 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f) (Supp. V 2005)); see also 38
C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2003) (implementing 38 U.S.C. § 1116). In order to be entitled to
receive disability benefits, a veteran generally must establish that she (in addition to being
honorably discharged) has a current disability, that the disability is connected to service in the
armed forces, and that it is not the result of the abuse of drugs or alcohol. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110,
1131 (2000); see also VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 20, at 45-251 (describing in-
depth the laws and regulations for service-connected disabilities). There are a number of ways in
which to establish that a veteran's disability is service-connected. One method is through the use
of statutory presumptions. The issue in Haas concerned such a presumption. If a veteran served
in Vietnam and has a "disability... resulting from exposure to a herbicide agent," that veteran is
presumed to have been exposed to Agent Orange. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f) (Supp. V 2005). The
statute lists diseases that, based on scientific evidence, are deemed to be linked to such exposure.
Id. § I 16(a)(2) (2000). Thus, if a veteran established she was in Vietnam during the appropriate
time and that she currently has one of the listed diseases, there arises a presumption of service-
connection for that disability. Id. § II 16(a)(3).
122. Haas, 20 Vet. App. at 279. The Federal Circuit eventually reversed the Veterans Court
on this point, holding that the statute and relevant regulations required a veteran to have been on
land to be entitled to the presumption of exposure. Haas, 525 F.3d at 1197.
123. See Memorandum No. 01-06-24 from James P. Terry, Chairman, Bd. of Veterans'
Appeals (Sept. 21, 2006) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
124. See id.
125. See id. (indicating that the memorandum was issued at the Secretary's request).
126. See Ribaudo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 552, 553 (2007) (en banc).
127. Id.
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Ribaudo represents an impediment to achieving Congress's vision reflected
in the VJRA because of the resistance of the executive branch to the authority
of the Veterans Court. It was frankly shocking that the Secretary could think
that it was consistent with the rule of law to essentially ignore the decision of a
court because he disagreed with an outcome.' 28 It turned out to be the case that
the Veterans Court got it wrong in Haas, at least according to the Federal
Circuit. 129 It may also have been the case that the impact of such an erroneous
decision would have been great. But both of these points are irrelevant. In a
system in which there is obedience to the rule of law, one simply cannot
unilaterally ignore decisions of courts. If the Secretary had been convinced
that the decision-which he had a right to appeal-was not only incorrect, but
would have a significant detrimental effect on the Department, he could have
sought a stay from the Veterans Court.' 30 What he could not do in our system,
however, as the Veterans Court made clear, is act unilaterally.
13 1
The Secretary's action in Ribaudo is even more significant because it is not
an isolated incident. In 2005, the Secretary disagreed with another decision of
the Veterans Court and engaged in the same type of unilateral action, staying
adjudication of certain cases pending before the Board.' 32 When that action
was challenged, the Veterans Court made quite clear that the Secretary simply
could not ignore orders of the Veterans Court even if he disagreed with such
decisions vehemently. 1
33
The Secretary's actions defying the Veterans Court go to the very heart of
the current system for judicially reviewing veterans' benefits determinations.
If the Department will not recognize the Court's authority-indeed, in some
sense its legitimacy-after two decades, the system as it currently stands is
likely irretrievably broken. At a minimum, these actions reflect a significant
flaw in the process.
128. 1 wish to make unmistakably clear that this conclusion is mine and not that of the
Veterans Court. The Court in Ribaudo stated that the Secretary's legal arguments in the appeal at
least "were made in good faith." See id. at 554 n.2.
129. See Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 77 U.S.L.W.
3267 (U.S. Jan 21, 2009) (No. 08-525).
130. See Ribaudo, 20 Vet. App. at 560.
131. Id. at 558.
132. See Memorandum No. 01-05-08 from Ron Garvin, Acting Chairman, Bd. of Veterans'
Appeals (Apr. 28, 2005) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review) (ordering the stay of
adjudication concerning certain matters regarding claims for tinnitus).
133. See Ramsey v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 16, 37-38 (2006). I have also discussed the
importance of Ramsey elsewhere. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 512-14.
In Ribaudo, the Secretary argued that Ramsey's clear rejection of the Secretary's unilateral action
was mere dicta. The Veterans Court did not accept this argument. See Ribaudo, 20 Vet. App. at
554 n.2.
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e. The Relationship Between the Veterans Court and Congress
There is also a certain tension between Congress and the Veterans Court
under the current system. As described above, the Veterans Court is a body
independent of the Department.1 34 It is also self-evidently (as well as expressly
defined as) a court of law.' 35 Yet, Congress at times treats the Veterans Court
in a manner more akin to an administrative agency or other, non-judicial body.
For example, some of this tension is no doubt attributable to the fact that
legislative jurisdiction over the Veterans Court is not with the judiciary
committees of either the House of Representatives or the Senate. Instead, the
veterans affairs committees of each chamber have responsibility for the
Court.136 Although this division of responsibility makes sense in terms of the
subject matter with which the Court deals, it can lead to congressional actions
that are at odds with the manner in which the legislative branch customarily
deals with judicial bodies.
A prime example can be seen in a bill the House of Representatives passed
in the summer of 2008. This bill purported to instruct the Court on the
arguments it would be required to address when adjudicating an appeal. 137
Specifically, the bill provided that "The Court shall have power to affirm,
modify, reverse, remand, or vacate and remand a decision of the Board after
deciding all relevant assignments of error raised by an appellant for each
particular claim for benefits." 38 This portion of the bill was not a part of the
statute signed into law.139 Nevertheless, it is significant that one chamber of
the legislative branch seriously considered instructing a court of law about how
to proceed in a core function of the judiciary-the contents of an opinion.
Congress certainly had a laudable goal prompting such contemplated
interference with the Veterans Court's decision-making process. As the House
committee report accompanying its version of the bill makes clear, Congress is
concerned about the high number of remands in the system and the
corresponding delay that veterans experience.140 However, congressional good
intentions do not make up for the awkwardness associated with such potential
interference with the operation of an independent court. There are many
reasons in a given case for a court not to reach a given assertion of error raised
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. See 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2000).
136. See United States House of Representatives Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Committee Jurisdiction, http://veterans.house.gov/about/jurisdiction.shtml (last visited Jan. 27,
2009); United States Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Committee Jurisdiction,
http://veterans.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?pageid=9 (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
137. See Veterans Disability Benefits Claims Modernization Act of 2008, H.R. 5892, 110th
Cong. § 202 (2008) (as passed by House, July 30, 2008).
138. Id. § 202 (emphasis added).
139. See Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, 122 Stat. 4145
(codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
140. See H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at 18-20 (2008).
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by one of the parties. To take just one hypothetical example, a party may raise
a constitutional issue that could be avoided by basing a decision on a
procedural ground. If the House's proposal had become law, the Veterans
Court would have been required by law to address that constitutional issue
even though there is a well-established doctrine under which courts will avoid
deciding constitutional questions if at all possible.'41
In sum, the tension this bill reflects between Congress and the Veterans
Court is an important feature of the current system. 142 If Congress ultimately
engages in such micromanagement of the Veterans Court, it would seriously
undermine the actual or perceived independence of the body Congress created
twenty years ago.
f The Perception of the Veterans Court Outside of the System
The final significant drawback in the current system of judicial review of
veterans' benefits determinations concerns the perception of the Veterans
Court by those outside the system. The Court suffers from two types of
perception problems that have the potential to limit its effectiveness. The first
is that some courts do not understand the very nature of the Veterans Court.
For example, in Jackson v. United States, 143 the United States Court of Federal
Claims was faced with a complaint that sought, in part, to challenge the denial
of a claim for veterans' benefits. 144 The Court of Federal Claims recognized
that it did not have jurisdiction over the claim and turned to whether it could
transfer the matter."45  It determined it could not and, in reaching this
conclusion, displayed a remarkable misapprehension of the status of the
Veterans Court as reflected in its initial slip opinion in Jackson in which the
court stated:
Both the Board of Veterans' Appeals and the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims are administrative agencies within the Department
of Veterans Affairs, and 28 U.S.C. § 1631 does not permit transfer
from this Court (or any court) to an administrative agency.146
141. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.").
142. This tension is not new. In 1992, shortly after the Court's creation, the House Veterans'
Affairs Committee sought to hold an "oversight hearing" for the Court, similar to hearings held
for administrative agencies. See Nebeker Remarks, supra note 66, at 15. Chief Judge Nebeker
indicated he would not appear and the committee did not press the matter. Id. This is yet another
example of the difficulties inherent in the current system in terms of the relationship between
Congress and the Veterans Court.
143. 80 Fed. Cl. 560 (2008).
144. Id. at 563.
145. Id. at 565-66.
146. Jackson v. United States, No. 07-713 C, slip. op. at 8 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 27, 2008).
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This incorrect statement concerning the status of the Veterans Court remained
in the Court of Federal Claims' opinion in Jackson through at least August 22,
2008.147 Interestingly, the quotation set forth above does not appear in the
version of the opinion appearing in the official Federal Claims Reporter even
though there is no indication in that opinion that there was a change from the
version that had been in place previously.
148
Such a fundamental misunderstanding of the Veterans Court's nature as
reflected in the original opinion in Jackson speaks volumes about the
misunderstood nature of this Article I court. It suggests at a minimum that the
word has not spread sufficiently about what Congress sought to accomplish in
the VJRA. 149
The second problem is more complex and, in some respects, at least partially
the result of the Veterans Court's own actions. Specifically, the Veterans
Court is seen as being sufficiently limited in the nature of relief it may award
that its role is devalued. A lawsuit filed in the Northern District of California
provides a useful example. 150  In 2007, several nonprofit organizations
purporting to represent the interests of veterans who had served in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other theaters of operation filed a lawsuit against a number of
federal government officials. 151 Specifically, the plaintiffs sued the Secretary
of the Department of Veterans Affairs along with several other high-ranking
members of the Department, the Chairman of the Board of Veterans' Appeals,
the Attorney General of the United States, and Veterans Court Chief Judge
Greene. 152 The plaintiffs challenged the veterans' benefits claims adjudication
147. A LEXIS printout of Jackson dated August 22, 2008, contains the same language
incorrectly describing the Veterans Court. See Jackson v. United States, No. 07-713 C, 2008 U.S.
Claims LEXIS 53, at *18 (Fed. CI. Feb. 27, 2008) (dated Aug. 22, 2008) (on file with the
Catholic University Law Review).
148. See Jackson, 80 Fed. Cl. at 566. In the bound volume this portion of the opinion reads
as follows:
The Board of Veterans' Appeals is an administrative agency within the Department of
Veterans Affairs, and 28 U.S.C. § 1631 does not permit transfer from this Court (or any
court) to an administrative agency. Further, while the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims is an Article I court rather than an administrative agency, it is not a "court"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
149. One could cite other illustrations as well. For example, in a litigation filed by a group of
veterans dissatisfied with the overall VA adjudicative process, a United States District Judge
displayed at least a subtle suspicion about the true nature of the Veterans Court. See Veterans for
Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10,
2008) ("Defendants claim that even though the [Veterans Court] is an Article I court, it is
nevertheless independent from the VA, and is therefore insulated from any waiver of sovereign
immunity under the [Administrative Procedures Act]." (emphasis added)). I discuss this case
further in the next several paragraphs of this subpart.
150. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
151. See id. at 1055-56 (ruling on merits of claims after bench trial); Veterans for Common
Sense, 2008 WL 114919, at *1-2 (ruling on motions to dismiss).
152. Veterans for Common Sense, 2008 WL 114919, at *1.
[Vol. 58:361
The Successes and Shortcomings of the Veterans Court
process on a number of constitutional and statutory grounds.153 They sought
declaratory and injunctive relief that would, if granted, have had a significant
effect on how claims were adjudicated, at least within the Department.
Early in the litigation, the district court denied, in most respects, a motion to
dismiss. 155 A significant rationale on which the district court based its decision
was that the current claims adjudication process did not provide an alternative
adequate remedy by which the plaintiffs could raise their system-wide claims
before the Veterans Court.' 56 The district court cited Veterans Court decisions
interpreting the relevant statues as limiting the Court to the adjudication of
individual claims alone.
157
The district court was correct that the Veterans Court had interpreted the
VJRA as limiting its ability to deal with such system-wide claims. For
example, although the district court did not do so, it could have cited American
Legion v. Nicholson158 for the proposition. The issue in American Legion was
essentially whether the Veterans Court had the authority to entertain a petition
for a writ of mandamus filed by the American Legion instead of an individual
veteran. 159  The Veterans Court held (four to three) that it was without
jurisdiction to issue the requested writ and that the American Legion lacked
standing to pursue its petition.' In particular, the Court determined that
"Congress has expressly limited our jurisdiction to addressing only appeals and
petitions brought by individual claimants."'
61
In sum, there is evidence of a perception that the Veterans Court's role is
fundamentally limited. That perception is in part the result of the Veterans
Court's own decisions, so other actors cannot truly be faulted for their
conclusions. Nevertheless, this perception--or perhaps better described,
reality-is a weakness in the current system.
III. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?: A LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION TO EVALUATE
THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VETERANS' BENEFITS DETERMINATIONS
This Article has thus far described the current system for judicially
reviewing veterans' benefits determinations as well as the successes and
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id. The district court ultimately ruled against the plaintiffs after a bench trial. See
Veterans for Common Sense, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1091-92.
155. Veterans for Common Sense, 2008 WL 114919, at *1.
156. See id. at *7-10.
157. See id. (citing, inter alia, Cleary v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 305 (1995); Dacoran v. Brown,
4 Vet. App. 115 (1993); Erspamer v. Derwinski, I Vet. App. 3 (1990)).
158. 21 Vet. App. 1 (2007) (en banc).
159. See id. at 2. The specific issue concerned the Secretary's direction that the Board stay
cases affected by the Veterans Court's decision in Haas. See id. This issue was discussed earlier
in this subpart. See supra text accompanying notes 121-34.
160. See American Legion, 21 Vet. App. at 8-9.
161. Id. at 8.
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shortcomings of that system. This section considers what should be done as
Congress's revolutionary experiment recently turned twenty. Specifically, this
section proposes that Congress create an independent commission to evaluate
the success of the 1988 VJRA and make recommendations concerning changes
that should be considered in the system. 162 It also outlines the core values that
Congress should require the Commission to consider when performing its
work. 1
63
Before addressing these matters, it is worth considering why such an
evaluation should be undertaken at all. Some might argue that unless there are
significant problems with the current system, there is no need to consider
change at all. In more colloquial terms, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." There
are two responses to that point of view. First, the argument against a
reevaluation misses the fundamental point of considering changes to this
particular system. For most of the history of the United States there was no
judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions.164 That all changed with the
enactment of the VJRA and the creation of the Veterans Court. Congress and
President Reagan began a revolutionary journey in 1988. At the very least, the
current political structure should take time to reflect on whether that revolution
has been successful. The Veterans Court's twentieth anniversary provides an
opportunity to do so.
Second, as outlined above, there are issues in the current system that call for
some level of change.' 65 I discuss these issues further in connection with the
various options considered below.' 66 The issues are ones that could be dealt
with by making changes within the current structure or by making changes to
the current structure itself, or both. In sum, then, reflection is warranted here
both to be faithful to Congress's choice twenty years ago as well as to ensure
that veterans are receiving the best review possible in the system.
A. A Proposal for a Legislative Commission
Congress should establish a "Commission to Study the Judicial Review of
Veterans' Benefits Determinations" (the "Commission"). 167 The Commission
162. See infra Part III.A.
163. See infra Part III.B.
164. See supra Part IL.A (discussing judicial review prior to VJRA).
165. See supra Part II.C.2.
166. See infra Part IV.
167. It is also possible that the Commission could be established by the President through an
Executive Order, as was done with the Dole-Shalala Commission. See supra text accompanying
notes 3-6 (discussing report). Alternatively, the Commission could be a joint creation of
Congress and the President. The key feature of the Commission must be that it is-and appears
to be-independent of the Department. Although presidential creation or a joint body would be
acceptable, congressional creation is the best way in which to ensure this independence given the
Department's position as part of the executive branch. In any event, it is critical that the
Commission should not be one controlled by the Department. This type of structure can work in
certain situations. For example, in a recently enacted law, Congress directed the Department to
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should be led by a chairperson or chairpersons who are widely respected and
seen to be independent, particularly of influence from the Department. The
leader or leaders of the Commission must also be politically savvy as well as
capable of the follow through necessary to make the Commission's work
meaningful in the real world.
The Commission should be composed of representatives from all the
relevant constituencies affected by, and involved in, the award of veterans'
benefits. These constituencies include veterans (and other claimants in the
system), most likely represented through the various Veterans Service
Organizations that exist (for example, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, the
American Legion, the Vietnam Veterans of America, and others) although
there could also be representatives of less traditional veterans organizations 
68
The constituencies also include the Department in all its facets (thus the RO
adjudicators, the Board, the litigation arm of the Department, and the
Secretary, probably through the Office of the General Counsel, should all be
included); the Veterans Court; the Federal Circuit; and Congress itself. In
addition, the Commission should have a member or members who are not
aligned with any constituency but who have studied the process.
Congress should also ensure that the Commission has adequate resources
with which to perform its functions. The Commission should be provided with
a staff for, among other things, data collection and analysis, as well as space in
which to work. It should also have sufficient funds available to allow the
Commissioners to travel so that public hearings can be held to obtain the
greatest input of views.
The Commission should be charged with evaluating the current state of
appellate review of veterans' benefits determinations and making
recommendations concerning changes that might be made to that system.
There should be no constraints imposed on the Commission with respect to the
create an Advisory Committee on Disability Compensation. See Veterans' Benefits Improvement
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, § 214, 122 Stat. 4145, 4152-54 (amending 38 U.S.C. § 546).
Given the focus of this legislation on the claim process itself, situating an advisory commission
within the Department makes sense. Such an entity would have the expertise on the process at
this level of detail. The Commission I propose would have a charge that is far broader and
concerns matters that go well beyond claims processing with respect to which the Department has
special expertise.
168. For example, the Commission could include representatives of veterans groups that have
fought against the current system such as Veterans for Common Sense or Veterans United for
Truth, Inc., both of which were plaintiffs in the lawsuit filed in federal court in California
challenging the VA claims adjudication process. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563
F. Supp. 2d 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Care would need to be taken in selecting such groups for
inclusion on the Commission to ensure that they in fact represent a significant number of veterans
or other claimants.
169. For specific examples of some options the Commission might consider, see infra Part
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options it might consider or propose, or both. 170 Finally, the Commission
should be directed to submit a report to Congress within a defined period of
time. That report should describe the Commission's activities, provide
relevant background and statistical information, and set forth specific
proposals for changes to the system warranted by the Commission's
investigation.
B. Values the Commission Must Consider
As I described above, the Commission I call for should be given wide
latitude to evaluate the current system of judicial review of veterans' benefits
determinations and to make appropriate recommendations. No restrictions
should be imposed on the Commission in terms of the solutions it might
consider or propose. However, Congress should make clear that the
Commissioners must be cognizant of three broad values when making their
recommendations: (1) the interests of veterans; (2) institutional interests in the
context of the American constitutional system of government; and (3) the
public's interest in the process. This subpart briefly discusses each of these
concerns in turn.
1. The Interests of Veterans
The paramount interest the Commission must consider is that of the veteran.
The Nation should never forget-and I am confident none of the people
involved in the process do-that the entire structure of veterans' benefits law
exists for the purpose of providing support to the men and women who served
this country. Thus, the Commission must ensure that it proposes nothing that
harms the interests of the beneficiaries of the system.
Veterans' interests fall into five broad categories:
* Accuracy: Veterans have an interest in ensuring that decisions
concerning the award of benefits be as accurate as possible. The
gains in accuracy that have likely been achieved over the past
twenty years, due in part to judicial review, should be preserved.
* Fairness: It is critically important that the system of awarding
benefits and reviewing such decisions be bothfair and be perceived
as being fair. Veterans need to believe that the system provides an
opportunity for their claims to be adjudicated in a manner that is,
broadly speaking, consistent with the rule of law. Thus, the gains in
the nature of VA decision-making (for example, better reasoned
decisions) need to be preserved. In addition, the substantive
fairness of the process needs to be preserved as well. Finally, one
needs to be concerned with the speed of the decision-making
process.
170. As described in the next subpart, the Commission should be required to consider certain
systemic values when performing its work and making its recommendations. See infra Part III.B.
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* Transparency: Closely related to fairness is veterans' interest in a
transparent process. Largely as a result of the influence of the
Veterans Court (although aided by Congress), the process of
awarding benefits has become more open. That trend should be
preserved.
* Predictability: It is important that veterans and their counsel (as
well as the agency, of course) be in a position to predict how issues
will be resolved. Of course there will always be a level of
uncertainty in any legal system populated by humans. Nevertheless,
the value of enhanced predictability of results is important for the
system.
" Finality: No legal system can exist for long in any functional
respect if disputes never come to an end. Veterans, as well as the
VA, have an interest in having disputes resolved once and for all.
The value of finality should not drive the system. There should be
means of correcting errors, but those means need to be balanced
against the interests of repose. Thus, finality itself is a value that
should be considered when evaluating the current--or a future-
system concerning the award of veterans' benefits and the judicial
review of such decisions.
2. Institutional Concerns
A second interest that the Commission must consider concerns the
preservation of American constitutional values. In particular, the importance
in the American constitutional order of the maintenance of separate and
independent centers of political authority must be a part of the Commission's171
deliberations. This is a structural concern. Thus, it is important to preserve
an independent institutional check on the political branches' authority to award
veterans' benefits.
The Veterans Court was created as an Article I tribunal, 172 meaning that its
members do not enjoy the tenure and salary protections afforded judges
serving in the coordinate Article III judiciary.173 Under well-established law,
there is no structural constitutional violation flowing from the assignment of
171. I use "structural" in this context in contrast to the individual rights concerns that
veterans might lodge based on constitutional principles such as due process or equal protection.
Structural concerns go to the power relationships between and among the various centers of
political authority in the American constitutional order; for example, the states and the coordinate
branches of the federal government.
172. See 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2000) ("There is hereby established, under Article I of the
Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims.").
173. Compare U.S. CONST. art. Il1, § I (providing Article III judges with tenure during "good
Behaviour" and salary protection), with 38 U.S.C. § 7253(c), (e) (setting terms of office and
salary ofjudges of the Veterans Court).
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the adjudication of disputes concerning veterans' benefits to such an Article I
tribunal. 174 Veterans benefits are a "public right."'175 That is, entitlement to
benefits flows from statutes instead of from the common law or the
Constitution itself.176 Congress has wide latitude to assign the adjudication of
disputes concerning such public rights to non-Article III adjudicators such as
the Veterans Court.
17 7
The structural and institutional concerns the Commission must consider are
less formal than involving the Article III judiciary in the process to legitimize
it.178 Of course, Article III court review is one way to preserve institutional
concerns regarding separation of powers, but there are other ways by which
such power divisions can be established and maintained. The key is to provide
a system of review with sufficient independence so that there is a meaningful
check on the unilateral authority of the political branches.
3. The Public Interest
Finally, any consideration of the judicial review of veterans' benefits
decisions needs to take into account the public's interest in maintaining a
system that, while fair to veterans, also safeguards the great resources devoted
to veterans and their dependants. 179 The public has a right to expect that the
funds allotted to the Department for the payment of veterans' benefits are spent
according to the directions of Congress and the President.
174. See Smith v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 267, 273-74 (1991) (citing Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985)).
175. Id.at271.
176. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.22
(1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (describing '"payments to veterans' as an
example of a public right (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932))); see also
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 370 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing Court's definition of public rights over time).
177. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855, 857
(1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590-91, 593-94; Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. at 272.
178. Of course, the Supreme Court must be involved under the terms of the Constitution
itself. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (providing Congress with the authority to "constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" (emphasis added)). In addition, the Supreme Court has
indicated, although not formally held, that some provision for meaningful Article III appellate
review may also be constitutionally required. See, e.g., N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69 n.23 (opinion
of Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court had previously "suggested that
[Congress] may be required to provide ... for Art. III judicial review" when matters are assigned
for adjudication to an actor outside the Article III structure (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 n.13 (1977))).
179. For example, in 2006 the Department provided more than $34 billion in disability
compensation, death compensation, and pensions to veterans and their family members. Press
Release, Department of Veterans Affairs, supra note 18.
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IV. SOME COMMENTS ON THE COMMISSION'S SUBSTANTIVE WORK
As described in Part III, the legislative Commission this Article proposes
should not be limited prospectively with specific policy choices or options for
reform. To be faithful to this charge, the Article does not advocate that the
Commission take any particular action. All relevant constituencies need a real
voice in the process if any reform is to be successful.
This Part is designed to present potential options the Commission may wish
to consider in its deliberations. I do strongly suggest that certain options be
rejected, but by and large this Part does not make specific recommendations.
The Article presents four broad options for reform. As explained below, only
two of these possibilities are realistic given the values discussed above.' 80
A. Option One: Make No Changes
One can forget that "staying the course" is itself a decision. In other words,
not making any changes to the current system is an option in and of itself. So
long as one makes this choice consciously, it is an entirely valid decision.
Under this option, there would be no significant alteration to the system as
currently structured. 181 It is true that the current system of judicial review has
had positive effects in the system as a whole.' 82 However, four factors lead me
to conclude that simply staying with the current approach would not
sufficiently protect the various values articulated above. Thus, in reality this
option is not viable.
First, and probably most importantly, the volume of cases coming to the
Veterans Court makes maintaining the current structure with no significant
changes infeasible. In fiscal year 2002, there were 2150 cases filed at the
court.183 Only five years later, that number was 4644, a more than 100%
increase.' 84 As a result of this dramatic increase in cases, all recall-eligible
retired judges of the court have been recalled for service.' 8 5 There does not
appear to be any realistic possibility that the upward trend in cases will change
anytime soon. For this reason alone there needs to be some change in the
system.
Second, as I have noted above and in other writings, the current structure of
judicial review creates tensions between the Veterans Court and the Federal
Circuit that have the potential to undermine the system as a whole.' 86 The
180. See supra Part III.B. As I acknowledge below, these options are not exhaustive.
181. The current system is described above. See supra Part II.A.
182. See supra Part II.C. 1.
183. VETERANS COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50.
184. Id.
185. See Miscellaneous Orders 2007, supra note 54 (Nos. 23-07, 22-07, 16-07, 03-07, 02-07,
01-07) (six orders recalling retired judges).
186. See supra Part II.C.2.c; see also Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 523-
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difficulties resulting from the relationship between these two courts include
both doctrinal confusion on matters of law and additional delays for veterans
and other claimants.' 87  While perhaps not as practically significant as the
caseload concerns at the Veterans Court, the inter-court relationship raises
important concerns with maintaining the current system.
Third, as described above, the Veterans Court is often misunderstood or
underappreciated as an institution by other judicial actors. Perhaps the
further passage of time would alleviate this concern, but there is no guarantee
that this is the case. Thus, to ensure that the body adjudicating such important
disputes has the respect necessary to make its judgments authoritative in a
practical sense, it is necessary to move from the current structure in at least
some respect.
Finally, the relationship between the Secretary and the Veterans Court
makes maintaining the current system an untenable option. The Secretary
often treats the Veterans Court in a way that is fundamentally inconsistent with
the rule of law. 89 When a member of the executive branch of government
takes action that amounts to defying the binding decisions of a judicial body,' 90
there is a fundamental structural problem that must be addressed.
B. Option Two: Return to the Days of "Splendid Isolation " 191
It is possible (theoretically at least) to argue for a return to the days in which
there was effectively no judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions. I reject
this option out of hand. As catalogued above, principally in Part II.C.1, the
successes of judicial review in this area of the law have been significant.
There are, no doubt, problems in the current system. However, those problems
do not suggest that the entire system of judicial review should be abandoned
when it has brought such important benefits. This option should be included in
order to be thorough, but it is not viable.
C. Option Three: Maintain the Current System with Changes
Doing nothing or returning to a world in which there is no judicial review
are not realistic approaches to the current state of veterans' benefits law. This
subpart and the next discuss the two broad, and feasible, options that should be
the focus of the Commission's work. This subpart discusses the first viable
option: keeping the current structure in place but making changes within that
187. See Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 523, 527; see also supra note 62
and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part II.C.2.c.
189. See supra Part II.C.2.d (addressing cases in which the Secretary has ignored decisions of
the Veterans Court).
190. See supra Part II.C.2.d.
191. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (noting that "Congress established no
judicial review for VA decisions until 1988, only then removing the VA from what one
congressional Report spoke of as the agency's 'splendid isolation"').
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system to address some of its shortcomings and future challenges. I describe
four such changes below; each is relatively modest.
1. Permanently Increase the Number of Judges on the Veterans Court
Congress has already taken a first step toward reform by increasing the
number of judges serving on the Veterans Court from seven to nine effective in
December 2009.192 Such an increase will undoubtedly help in handling the
influx of cases the Veterans Court has experienced. At the same time, it is
unlikely that a modest increase in. the membership of the Court would have a
negative effect on the collegiality of the body, or its ability to shape veterans'
benefits law with a single voice (at least subject to the Federal Circuit). 193
However, Congress has authorized the increase in judges only through January
1, 2013, at which point the Court would return to its current size absent
congressional action.' 94  Consideration should be given to making the
expansion of the Veterans Court permanent.
2. Increase the Role of Lawyers Throughout the System
A second change focuses on the role of lawyers throughout the veterans'
benefit system. As described above, the veterans' benefits system was
designed to be non-adversarial. 195 Whether that is in fact the case is unclear.
196
Regardless of the true state of affairs, it would be possible to explicitly alter the
system from the ground up to include lawyers. Congress has already taken
such a step by removing the practical bar to hiring attorneys before the Board
has issued a decision. 197 Further steps could be taken to provide for procedures
at the RO level that are more akin to traditional adversarial processes. For
example, one could adopt some form of formal discovery devices in place of,
or in addition to, the current procedures under which the Department
unilaterally provides information to the veteran.'
98
Steps could also be taken at the appellate level in the Veterans Court to
increase the role of lawyers. To be sure, proceedings at the Court are
adversarial. The issue is that the Veterans Court has a high percentage of cases
192. See Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, § 601, 122
Stat. 4145, 4176-77 (amending 38 U.S.C. § 7253).
193. For a general discussion of the importance of collegial decision-making in appellate
courts and a sampling of literature on the subject, see Allen, Significant Developments, supra note
1I, at 518-19.
194. Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act § 601, 122 Stat. at 4177.
195. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
196. See, e.g., supra note 106 (discussing conflicting accounts of the nature of the VA
adjudication process).
197. See The Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3403, 3405.
198. For example, the Department has duties to both notify veterans of certain information
when they file a claim, see 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (2000), as well as to assist them in certain
respects in connection with such a claim, see 38 U.S.C. § 5103A.
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in which veterans proceed pro se. For example, in 2007, 53% of veterans
appeared pro se at the time of the filing of an appeal. 199 That percentage
declined by the time a decision was rendered, but was still significant at
19%. 200 The Court and other organizations could increase their efforts to make
pro bono representation available to pro se veterans.
20 1
Such changes throughout the system could provide important benefits. For
example, veterans may have an increased sense of their due process rights if
they perceive the playing field as being level. In addition, as the claims
process has become more regularized through the Veterans Court's
development of a uniform body of law, trained lawyers could increase the
efficiency of the system at the appellate level. After all, lawyers are taught to
take the law and apply it to the facts. Experienced representation of veterans
earlier in the claims process may reduce the number of cases reaching the
Veterans Court because errors could be identified and, one would hope,
corrected at the agency level.
Yet the Commission must also consider the dangers inherent in increasing
the role of lawyers. First, care must be taken to not alter the parts of the
process that currently work well, unless there is an overall benefit to veterans.
For example, the Department's duties to notify and assist veterans are
important parts of the current process. 202 These duties should not be jettisoned
unless Congress provides alternative protections for veterans. Second, it is
important that one consider the system as a whole. Expanding the role of
lawyers only at the non-agency appellate level could ultimately do more harm
than good by exasperating the tensions already present when veterans move
from a purportedly non-adversarial system to the more traditional adjudicative
20process at the Veterans Court. °3 Finally, one needs to be aware of the
potential for adding additional delay to a system that is already plagued by this
problem. 204 Ultimately, factors that might add delay are empirical questions
that cannot be accurately predicted. Lawyers might actually speed the
adjudication of claims. The Commission should study this matter to the extent
feasible.
199. See VETERANS COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50.
200. Id
201. There are a number of organizations devoted to providing pro bono services to veterans,
including the Veterans Consortium Pro Bono Program and the National Veterans Legal Services
Program (NVLSP). See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 20, at 9-12 (discussing
NVLSP); The Veterans Consortium Pro Bono Program, http://www.vetsprobono.org (last visited
Jan. 27, 2009) (discussing organization).
202. See supra note 194. For additional information concerning the duties of notice and
assistance, see VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 20, at 884-901.
203. See supra Part II.C.2.b. (discussing the risk to veterans of transitioning to a more
adversarial system); see also Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 526-28 (same).
204. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text (discussing problems associated with
delays throughout the adjudication system).
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3. Increase the Expertise of RO Adjudicators and the Efficiency of RO
Adjudication
A third change focuses on the expertise of RO adjudicators and the overall
efficiency of the RO adjudication system. All things being equal, increasing
either or both of these items should improve the system. Congress recently
205took steps designed to address these issues at the RO level. The potential
difficulty is that, as a congressional committee report has recognized, there
may be only so much that can be done in the context of a "broken processing
system. ' 2° 6 In the end, it may be that there is little to be done to effectively
alter the system given this history. The Commission should address this issue.
4. Adopt Streamlining Procedures at the Veterans Court
Finally, the Veterans Court could take internal steps to streamline its
handling of the appeals it receives. For example, the Court might adopt a
summary disposition rule, at least in cases in which claimants are not
proceeding pro se. 207 The Court could also adopt a more aggressive system of
mediation, increase its use of electronic filing mechanisms, or amend its
procedures for assembling critical materials such as the record on appeal.2 °8
Each of these steps has at least the potential to reduce delay in individual
appeals, as well as make the system more efficient overall.
The matters cataloged above are by no means exclusive. However, they
suffice to illustrate the types of changes that could be implemented while
maintaining the current structure of veterans' benefits adjudication and review.
As should be apparent, these types of devices would address in some measure
concerns with overload and delay in the system. They would not alleviate
concerns that go much beyond caseload. Thus, the attractiveness of such
incremental changes is dependent on one's views regarding the importance of
the other concerns evident in the current structure. Suffice it to say, the
Commission would need to balance all of these concerns when evaluating the
current system as well as changes that might be desirable.
205. See Veterans Disability Benefits Claims Modernization Act of 2008, H.R. 5892 110th
Cong. §§ 103-05 (as passed by House, July 30, 2008).
206. H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at 3 (2008).
207. See Performance and Structure of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (written
testimony of William P. Greene, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims), available
at http://veterans.senate.gov/public/documents/Greene%20-%2ONov%207%2007.pdf at 7-9
(discussing the costs and benefits of allowing summary disposition).
208. See id. (discussing all of these possibilities).
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D. Option Four: Make Broad Changes in the Current System
The final reform option is to make broad changes in the current system of
judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions. There are many ways in which
one could significantly alter the current structure. For ease of reference, and as
an aid to discuss many of the possible options, this subpart diagrams four
structural scenarios. The scenarios discussed below are not exhaustive of the
possibilities that exist. They are merely representative of the matters the
Commission should consider. Moreover, it bears repeating that this Article
does not necessarily endorse any of these changes. They are presented as part
of the discussion I hope the Commission will begin in earnest.
Structural Scenario One
Supreme Court
IFederal Circuit
Veterans CourtI
Board
Fig. B
Scenario One, represented in Figure B above, is based on the assumption
that the basic structure of review of veterans' benefits as it currently exists
would remain in place. That is, the Board would render the final agency
adjudication of a claim. There would then be an appeal to the Veterans Court,
followed by review in the Federal Circuit and possibly in the Supreme Court
through certiorari. Because the current structure remains in place in Scenario
One, it would also be possible to include some or all of options mentioned
above in connection with Option Three. What follows is a discussion of three
potentially more significant changes that could be implemented in the context
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of the current structure. Note that the changes discussed here are not mutually
exclusive of one another. It would be possible to mix-and-match, so to speak,
by adopting only some of them. The Commission, of course, would need to
consider how adopting one type ,of change might alter the institution with
respect to the adoption of another.
1. Article Ill Status for the Veterans Court
One potential change is to convert the Veterans Court from an Article I
tribunal to a full-fledged Article III court. One could accomplish such a
conversion to Article III status in at least two ways. First, one could maintain a
role for the Federal Circuit and simply alter the status of the Veterans Court.
In this respect, matters would be similar to the relationship between the Article
III Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit.2° 9 Second, one could
merge the Veterans Court into the Federal Circuit and convert the status of the
current Veterans Court judges to conform to Article III's requirements. The
latter option is not reflected in Figure B above. With respect to a merger, one
would need to address the potential negative side-effect of losing subject-
matter expertise that could flow from eliminating the Veterans Court as an
independent entity.
As an initial matter, it does not appear that a conversion to Article III status
is necessary to ensure the independence of the Veterans Court. By all
appearances, the members of the Court consider themselves to be highly
independent of political influence even though they do not have constitutional
tenure or salary protection. Moreover, there has not, to my knowledge, been
any suggestion that the judges of the Court lack the independence necessary to
perform their important work. However, a conversion to Article III status
would have serious implications in other contexts, both positive and negative,
that should be the focus of the Commission's work.
a. Positive Effects ofArticle III Status
There are several potentially positive aspects of the Veterans Court's
conversion to Article III status. First, a conversion would likely increase the
level of respect for the Court both at the Department and in the current Article
III judiciary. It is difficult to imagine that the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California would treat a lawsuit against the Chief
Judge of an Article III court, such as the Ninth Circuit or the Federal Circuit, in
the same manner as it did in the suit against the Chief Judge of the currently
209. The Court of International Trade (CIT), reconstituted in its current form by the Customs
Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727, 1727, is an Article III tribunal
whose jurisdiction focuses on a variety of trade-related matters. See generally United States
Court of International Trade, About the Court, http://www.cit.uscourts.giv/informational/
about.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (outlining the history and jurisdictional scope of the CIT).
The Federal Circuit hears appeals from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000). Unlike the
Veterans Court, the CIT is a trial level adjudicator. See id.
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constituted Veterans Court. 2 1  Nor would the Court of Federal Claims
misapprehend the nature of the Veterans Court if it were an Article III body.
211
Second, it is unlikely that the Secretary would take actions in contravention
of an Article III court's rulings in the same way he has done with the Veterans
Court.212 Of course, there is no guarantee that the Secretary would deal with
the Veterans Court in a more appropriate manner. Yet one is hard-pressed to
find contemporary examples of an executive department's outright defiance of
an Article III court's judgment.
Third, an Article III conversion would likely ameliorate some of the tensions
and misunderstandings between the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit,
assuming these bodies remain separate. 213 As described above, the Federal
Circuit has at times seemed to misunderstand the nature of the Veterans
Court.2 14 That may be forgiven considering the unique nature of that body. A
conversion to a more traditional court would be more consistent with the
relationship between the Federal Circuit and other courts.
Fourth, conversion to Article III status would address the at times uneasy
relationship between Congress and the Veterans Court. As described above,
Congress has, in some respects, attempted to exert influence over the Court in
a manner that it would not do with respect to an Article III tribunal. For
example, it is unlikely that Congress would seriously consider instructing an
Article III court on the issues it must address when deciding a case. 215 Indeed,
given that the judicial power vests in the Article III courts, it would at least be
close to the constitutional line to do so. 216 Article III status for the Veterans
Court would take these issues off the table.
Fifth, as an Article III tribunal, the Veterans Court would have easier access
to resources that would assist it in matters such as recordkeeping, statistical
analyses, and administration. As an Article I body, the Court is not an entity
that is supported by organizations devoted to the judicial branch, such as the
210. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919, at
*20 (N.D. Cal. Jan 10, 2008) (refising to dismiss the complaint against Chief Judge Greene as
representative of the Veterans Court because the issue had not been raised in briefing). The
district court later dismissed the case against the Chief Judge. Order Granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss William P. Greene and Michael Mukasey, No. C-07-3758 SC (N.D. Cal. Mar.
13, 2008).
211. See Jackson v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 560, 566 (2008). Jackson was also discussed
above. See supra text accompanying notes 142-46.
212. See, e.g., Ribaudo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 552, 553 (2007); Ramsey v. Nicholson, 20
Vet. App. 16, 39 (2006). Both Ribaudo and Ramsey are discussed in Part II.C.2, supra.
213. See supra Part II.C.2.c (discussing this tension); see also Allen, Significant
Developments, supra note 11, at 523-24 (same).
214. Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 523.
215. See Veterans Disability Benefits Claims Modernization Act of 2008, H.R. 5892, 11 0th
Cong. § 202 (2008) (as passed by House, July 30, 2008).
216. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (providing for the vesting of the judicial power of the
United States).
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Administrative Office of United States Courts and the Federal Judicial
Center.21 7 This is not to say that the Court receives no support, but it is largely
on its own. Coming within the Article III fold, so to speak, would decrease
pressure on Court administrators to run and monitor the institution.
Finally, a conversion to Article III status might increase the broader
influence of the Veterans Court. The Court unquestionably has significant
influence in the veterans' benefits arena, which is to be expected. It is, after
all, the exclusive venue for an appeal from a final Board decision. 218 However,
the Court's work also addresses areas of importance beyond this niche. For
example, the Court produces a number of decisions each year under the Equal
Access to Justice Act. 219 In addition, the Court handles a high volume of pro
se cases both at filing and at disposition.220 Both of these matters would be of
interest to federal courts (and in some instances state courts). Yet, the
Veterans Court is almost never cited outside of the Federal Circuit for the
substance of its decisions. 22  Article III status could alter this state of affairs.
b. Potential Drawbacks to an Article III Conversion
There are also potential drawbacks of an Article III conversion of the
Veterans Court that should be considered, although they do not appear to be as
significant as the benefits of a conversion. First, introducing life tenure at the
Court would reduce the turnover of its members. Thus, there would be less of
an opportunity to introduce new ideas. This potential ossification is a
significant issue with which the Commission will need to wrestle.
In addition, a conversion to Article III status would likely increase the
political contentiousness of appointments to the Court. We have all seen in
recent years the maneuvering that is attendant to appointment to life-tenured
positions on federal courts. Of course, there may not be as much political
217. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts describes its mission as supporting the
judicial branch under the Constitution. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/adminoff.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2009). The Federal Judicial Center
explains that Article I tribunals are not a part of the judicial branch to which the FJC provides
services. See Federal Courts Outside the Judicial Branch, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf
page/external courts (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
218. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2000).
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2000) (permitting the Veterans Court to award attorneys fees
and costs to prevailing party). In the 2007 fiscal year the Court considered 1526 EAJA
applications. VETERANS COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50.
220. See VETERANS COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50 (reporting that in the 2007
fiscal year 53% of appellants were unrepresented at the time of filing and 19% remained
unrepresented at the time of closure of the case).
221. A search for references to the Veterans Court in the LexisNexis database indicates that,
with very few exceptions, the Court is discussed in connection with dismissing claims that are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Veterans Court but that have been misfiled elsewhere.
222. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 977-78 (2007) ("In the last two decades, ...
confirmation battles informed by ideological divides have seemed more intense .... ").
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intrigue associated with a body of limited jurisdiction such as the Veterans
Court, but there would almost certainly be more than there is at present.
Finally, a conversion to Article III status could have unintended
consequences on the operation of the Veterans Court. If the Veterans Court
were reconstituted as an Article III tribunal, all the restrictions on such bodies
would apply to it. In the main, these restrictions-such as the standing
doctrine and the prohibition on advisory opinions-would not alter the Court's
work because it has already adopted them as a matter of policy.
223
Nevertheless, Article III status could affect other aspects of the Veterans Court,
and the Commission should consider those effects. For example, the Veterans
Court currently has exclusive jurisdiction to consider appeals from final Board
decisions.224 As an Article III tribunal, without a statutory restriction, the
Veterans Court also would arguably have full authority to adjudicate additional
claims for which jurisdiction is based on supplemental jurisdiction. 22' This is
226the state of affairs with certain other Article III specialty courts. Of course,
the Veterans Court is an appellate body,2 27 which might alter the analysis. On
the other hand, it is the first link in the judicial process, making it similar to the
CIT.22 8  At the very least, the Commission should carefully consider the
jurisdictional effect of an Article III conversion.
2. Expansion of Federal Circuit Jurisdiction
Another option for broad reform within the context of the current system is
to alter the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. As it currently stands,
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is essentially limited to reviewing questions
of law;2 29 it is precluded from reviewing, in most cases, challenges to factual
matters or the application of law to fact.2 30  As I have described above and
223. See, e.g., Norvell v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 194, 200 (2008) (setting forth Court's decision
to abide by Article IlI's prohibition on issuing advisory opinions); In re Stanley, 9 Vet. App. 203,
209 (1996) (adhering to the standing requirement); Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 12, 14-15
(1990) (adopting case or controversy requirements for the Court).
224. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2000).
225. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
226. For example, the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning a
number of matters related to trade. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (setting forth the court's exclusive
jurisdiction). It also has the power to adjudicate claims beyond those matters over which it has
exclusive jurisdiction if, for example, supplemental jurisdiction applies. See, e.g., Salmon
Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 532 F.3d 1338, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing CIT's jurisdiction under § 1367).
227. See supra Part II.A (describing Veterans Court and its appellate nature).
228. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (establishing the appellate role of the Veterans Court),
with 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (establishing the role of the CIT in various trade disputes).
229. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1).
230. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
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elsewhere, this rather odd jurisdictional grant has caused certain difficulties in
the current system of judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions. 23 1
If the current structure remains in place, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
could be expanded to mirror that of most appellate bodies. Under this option,
the court would have plenary jurisdiction over alleged errors below and would
apply traditional rules for judging those alleged errors.2 32 This change would
help address some of the current disconnects in the system between these
bodies. On the other hand, it would also raise the possibility of greater delay in
an already prolonged process, as review at the Federal Circuit became more
sweeping. Expanding the Federal Circuit's review would also potentially have
a negative effect on the fundamental utility of the Veterans Court to be an
expert lawmaker in the veterans' benefits arena. That role would effectively be
transferred, in many respects, to the Federal Circuit. These are all matters the
233Commission would need to address in its investigation.
3. Expansion of Veterans Court Jurisdiction and Powers
Finally, one could maintain the current system but alter the jurisdiction or
powers, or both, of the Veterans Court. There are many ways this type of
change could be accomplished. This subpart describes only two potential
alterations: expanding the Veterans Court's jurisdiction to make factual
determinations in some situations and creating a procedural mechanism, or
mechanisms, by which the Veterans Court may adjudicate aggregate litigation.
The scope of potential changes is undeniably much broader and should be the
subject of Commission discussion.
At present, Congress has precluded the Veterans Court from making factual
determinations; the Board serves as the trier of fact.23 4 This state of affairs is
beneficial for a number of reasons, including regulating the workload of the
Court. A downside of the current approach, however, is that it builds delay
into the system because the Court must remand matters to the Board instead of
235itself making an initial factual determination.
If the Commission were to recommend expanding the power of the Court to
allow it to make factual determinations, it would need to wrestle with the
implications of such a decision on the nature of the institution. For example,
what would such an expansion do to the workload of the body? Similarly,
would such an alteration merely change where delay occurs, instead of
reducing the time to decision? The point is that a change that looks relatively
23 1. See supra Part II.C.2.c; Allen, Significant Developments, supra note 11, at 523-24.
232. For example, questions of law would be reviewed de novo, factual determinations
would be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and the like.
233. 1 discuss the option of reducing or eliminating the role of the Federal Circuit later in this
subpart in connection with Structural Scenario Two.
234. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) ("In no event shall findings of fact made by the Secretary or the
[Board] be subject to a trial de novo by the Court.").
235. See supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing delays in the current system).
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simple on paper can have rather significant consequences on the ground.
Charting out what those consequences will likely be should be a critical
function of the Commission.
The Commission could also consider providing for the Veterans Court to
hear aggregate litigation. The Court has been reluctant in several respects to
interpret the law to allow it to address such collective litigation.236 Congress
could provide that, in at least certain situations, the Court would have the
unquestioned authority to consider matters beyond an appeal of a single Board
decision by a single claimant. For example, Congress could direct the Court to
consider adopting a class action rule. The details of such a rule would be a
matter for close study and debate. The goal of the rule, however, would be to
identify those types of matters in which the resolution of a group of cases
together would advance the goals of the system overall.
Structural Scenario Two
Supreme Court
Veterans Court
F_ Board
Fig. C
Scenario Two, depicted in Figure C above, moves away from the current
structure of judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions by removing the
Federal Circuit from the mix entirely. An advantage of this approach is that it
eliminates the drawbacks associated with the current two-layer system of
appellate review with odd jurisdictional restrictions. 7 A potential negative
236. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1 (2007) (en banc) (dismissing petition
for writ of mandamus in part because a veteran service organization was not a proper party before
the Court); Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991) (rejecting the Court's authority
to consider class actions).
237. See supra Part II.C.2.c (discussing relationship between the Veterans Court and the
Federal Circuit as well as the problem of delay in the current system); see also Allen, Significant
Developments, supra note 11, at 523-24 (discussing the relationship between the Veterans Court
and the Federal Circuit).
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effect of removing the Federal Circuit is that doing so would reduce the input
from members of the third branch of the federal government in the process. As
I mentioned above in connection with the values the Commission should
consider, such participation is not mandated (at least not below the Supreme
Court level).238 However, even if not required, there may still be important
constitutional values at stake that need to be confronted when contemplating
the removal of the Federal Circuit from the process.
The Commission could likely satisfy those constitutional concerns by
converting the Veterans Court to an Article III body. But that is not necessary
to validate this structure. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces is an Article I tribunal from which the only appeal is by writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
23 9
Structural Scenario Three
Supreme Court
Veterans Court or Federal Circuit
Regional Regional Regional Regional
Board Board Board Board
Fig. D
Structural Scenario Three, depicted in Figure D above, alters the current
system principally at the level below the Veterans Court, that is, within the
Department. In this scenario, judicial review at the appellate level is at the
Veterans Court or the Federal Circuit. The Commission could maintain the
current two level system of appellate review, eliminate the Federal Circuit, or
even merge the Veterans Court with the Federal Circuit in some fashion.
However, the focus of this scenario is change at the Board level.
238. See supra Part III.B.2.
239. See 10 U.S.C. § 941 (2000) (stating that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is
established under Article I); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2000) (granting Supreme Court review, by
certiorari, for certain decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
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Many changes at the administrative level, both at the Board and the ROs,
could be accomplished without altering the current system. Some examples of
such changes were discussed above. 24  The specific suggestion reflected in
Scenario Three is more fundamental. It presents the option to regionalize the
Board. The country (and relevant extra-territorial locations) 2 1 would be
divided into a certain number of regions. Decisions of ROs in each region, to
which NODs were filed, would be appealed to a Board for that region.
Appeals from adverse decisions of each of those Regional Boards would lie
with the Veterans Court (or Federal Circuit depending on the structure of
appellate review).
The driving force behind this Scenario is a potential increase in efficiency of
the administrative system. It is possible that regionalization of the Board
would make the claims adjudication process within the Department more
efficient for at least some veterans. 242 Of course, it is also possible that such a
change would only engender further inefficiency and delay. In addition, a
growing lack of uniformity in the law as applied at the agency level might
occur, even with a watchful appellate body such as the Veterans Court further
up the chain of review. The Commission should carefully study the potential
implications of such a change but it should not be off the table for
discussion.
243
240. See supra Part IV.C.
241. There is an RO located in the Philippines. See U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Facilities
Locator & Directory (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.va.gov/directory/guide/home.asp.
242. See H.R. REP. No. 110-789, at 7 (noting increased claims backlog and processing
times).
243. This Scenario is also a reminder that a consideration of judicial review of veterans'
benefits decisions cannot realistically be limited to appellate judicial tribunals alone. The process
starts with line adjudicators and includes agency appellate review.
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Structural Scenario Four
I USDC SDC] Regional Regional
Board Board
Fig. E
Scenario Four, depicted in Figure E, continues the theme of Scenario Three
by focusing on the bottom of the claims adjudication process. The same
caveats discussed in connection with Structural Scenario Three above,
concerning the box labeled "Veterans Court or Federal Circuit," apply equally
in this Scenario. The difference here is that review of Board decisions is
244initially had in the regional federal district courts. Appeals from such
district court determinations would be to an appellate body, either the Veterans
Court or the Federal Circuit or some combination thereof.
245
244. Figure E indicates that the district courts would review decisions of the Board divided
into regions. This Scenario could also be structured in the same manner if the Commission did
not regionalize the Board. The only significant difference would involve the technical
determination of which district court would be a proper venue for a given appeal from a
centralized Board. All such decisions could be funneled to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. Alternatively, district court venue could be based on the location of the
RO with which the veteran initially filed her claim.
245. The system envisioned here is in many respects similar to the system currently in place
concerning judicial review of decisions denying Social Security benefits except that appeals from
the district courts would not be made to the regional courts of appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2000) (providing basis for a dissatisfied Social Security claimant to obtain review of benefits
denial in federal district court). As I acknowledged previously, see supra text accompanying
note 185, the Commission might consider a similar approach in connection with veterans benefits
matters as well.
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In most cases it is possible to pick and chose from the various alterations
discussed in this Article. However, if this Scenario were adopted, and the
Veterans Court was maintained in the chain of review, the Commission would
need to recommend conversion of that body to an Article III tribunal. It could
still be independent of the Federal Circuit (although it need not be). However,
the system would face serious constitutional issues if an Article III court's
determination (that is, the U.S. district courts') were reviewed and potentially
altered by an entity outside of the Article III structure.
246
There are at least three potential advantages of including district courts in
the process. First, it could possibly reduce the number of appeals at the
Veterans Court, because it is likely that not every case would be appealed from
the district court to an appellate judicial body. Veterans would have the ability
to have a check independent of the Department and would not necessarily feel
compelled to seek such review in the Veterans Court. Second, on a system-
wide basis it might reduce the time to decision in at least some cases. 247 Third,
district court review would provide a potential forum for fact finding and
development outside the agency if such additional factual analysis were
provided by statute. Moreover, this forum is one experienced in taking
testimony, reviewing documentary evidence, and generally making factual
determinations.
There are also potential drawbacks associated with adding the district courts
to the process. First, as highlighted above in this subpart, such a change would
require that the Veterans Court be converted to an Article III tribunal. Second,
and most significantly perhaps, the inclusion of another layer of decision-
maker might actually add to delays in a system already plagued by them. This
is, at its core, an empirical question that the Commission would need to
consider. Another potential negative is the inclusion in the system of an
adjudicator lacking expertise in veterans' benefit law. This is certainly an
issue of concern in the short run. It would become less so as district court
judges became more familiar with this area of the law. Finally, the
Commission should be concerned about increasing the workload of the federal
248district courts. These entities are already heavily burdened. Any increase intheir jurisdiction would need to be carefully considered.
246. See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (Dali.) 409, 413 (1792) (holding that federal courts could
not participate as commissioners in awarding veterans benefits when their decisions would be
subject to revision in an executive agency); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
218 (1995) (recognizing that Hayburn's Case "stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest
review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch").
247. As acknowledged below, adding an additional layer of decision-making also has the
potential to increase delay in the ultimate resolution of claims.
248. For example, in fiscal year 2007 there were 257,507 filings in the United States district
courts. See 2007 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 139 tbl. C.
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This Part has outlined some of the more potentially significant changes that
could be made in the current system of judicial review of veterans' benefits
decisions. It bears repeating that this discussion has not exhausted the options
the Commission should consider. For example, each of these proposals
maintains a narrow focus on veterans' cases. One could also add to any one of
these scenarios additional areas of the law to be grouped with veterans'
benefits. For example, one could reconceive the "Veterans Court" as a
"Disability Court" and include within its bailiwick matters such as social
security. Such a change would be far reaching indeed and would require
serious consideration. While I am not yet in a position to take a definitive
stance, my initial reaction is that such a change would not be beneficial.
Veterans' benefits law is unique-or at least unique enough-such that
expertise is important. I fear that such expertise would be diluted for
insufficient gain. That being said, this option should not be ruled out at least
from consideration by the Commission this Article proposes.
Another example is the elimination of a court focused only on the discrete
area of veterans law. 249 Instead of such a specialty court, appeals of Board
decisions could be channeled into the district courts, or perhaps even the
regional courts of appeals. Such a change would be quite a significant shift
from the pattern of the past twenty years. I fear that it would dilute the
uniformity and richness of the law in this area. It would also add to the
workload of the general federal bench. Nevertheless, the option should be
available to the Commission.
V. CONCLUSION
We are at a critical juncture concerning how we as a nation provide for our
veterans. Congress took a revolutionary step twenty years ago when it created
the Veterans Court. It is now time to take the next step and assess the success
of that endeavor. This Article has proposed a legislative commission as the
most appropriate means to do so.
In the end, I am not sure that a Commission, such as this Article proposes, is
politically viable. There are many competing points of view (even if one
assumes that all constituencies have veterans' welfare as a main goal) and a
large amount of money is at issue. Yet, I am sure that such a Commission is
249. There is a vast body of academic literature concerning the wisdom of specialty courts.
See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329
(1991); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative
Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L.REV. 1111 (1990).
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necessary if we are to be faithful to President Abraham Lincoln's call to honor
those who have served this country.250
250. See supra text accompanying note 2 (quoting President Lincoln's Second Inaugural
Address).
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